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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a defendant other than the United States (or an agency, officer, or employee of
the United States)' to serve an answer upon the plaintiff within twenty days
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona.
** B.A., University of Puget Sound; J.D., University of Washington; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock
& Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona.
1 See Langella v. Bush, 306 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that "the United
States, along with its agencies, officers, and employees, have sixty days in which to answer after
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after being served with a summons and complaint.2 However, this time for
answering is automatically extended if the defendant files a timely "preanswer" motion under Rule 12 , including specifically a Rulel2(b) motion
to dismiss the claims asserted in the complaint. 4 In that event, 5 the defendant ordinarily has until ten days after notice of the court's resolution of the
motion within which to serve its answer 6 (unless the court dismisses the
plaintiffs entire case, 7 in which situation the defendant need submit no further response to the complaint)."
In an effort to narrow the scope of an action, 9 or perhaps simply to

the United States Attorney is served with a complaint") (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(3)); Nanyonga v. INS, 200 F.R.D. 503, 505 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (stating "[f]ederal defendants have sixty
days to answer a complaint").
2 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(1)(a). The answer then must be filed with the court within a reasonable time after being served upon the plaintiff. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d); Katz v. Morgenthau,
709 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), a/l'd in part and rev'd in part, 892 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.
1989); Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4); Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D.
571, 572 (E.D. Va. 2002); Blessing v. Norman, 646 F. Supp. 82, 83 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Thierfield
v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
See McKinley Assocs., LLC v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 169, 188
(W.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 8 Fed. Appx. 31 (2d Cir. 2001); Ritts v. Dealers Alliance Credit Corp.,
989 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1997); First Am. Bank, N.A. v. United Equity Corp., 89
F.R.D. 81, 86 (D.D.C. 1981); Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 741-42 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Ju Shu Cheung v. Dulles, 16 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D. Mass. 1954).
5 Of course, "not every pre-answer motion falls under the ambit of Rule 12." Cont'l Cas. Co.
v. Marsh, No.01 C 0160, 2002 WL 31870531, at *3 (N.D. I1. Dec. 23, 2002). Only those that do
will automatically extend the time for answering under Rule 12(a). See Atl. Steamers Supply Co.
v. Int'l Mar. Supplies Co., 268 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating "Rule 12(a) extends
the time to serve a responsive pleading only when a motion is made that is permitted under Rule
12"); see, e.g., Creative Title Mktg., Inc. v. SICIS Int'l, S.r.L., 922 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 n.1 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (observing that "a motion to compel arbitration is not included in the ambit of Rule
12(b) motions that suffice as responsive pleadings in lieu of answers").
6 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(4)(A); Milk Drivers, Local Union 387 v. Roberts Dairy, 219
F.R.D. 151, 152 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115
(D. Minn. 2000); Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
However, the court can establish a different time for the moving defendant to answer, either explicitly or merely by postponing its disposition of the motion until trial. See FED. R. CIv. P.
12(a)(4)(A).
7 See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating "[tihe
district court dismissed the entire case under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim"); Kitras v.
Town of Aquinnah, 379 F. Supp. 2d 81, 82 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting "this Court allowed [defendant's] motion to dismiss the complaint, based upon several legal grounds, and ... that ruling
dismissed the case in its entirety").
8 See Lawhom v. AtI. Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1962); Ritts, 989 F. Supp. at
1480; Broglie, 75 F.R.D. at 742; Poe v. Cristina Copper Mines, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 85, 86 (D. Del.
1953).
9 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 710, 715 (N.D.
Ga. 1975) (stating "defendant seeks to employ Rule 12(b)(6) to narrow the scope of the issues in
this litigation by dismissing [a] portion of the complaint"); see also Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v.
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obtain more time to investigate and respond to the plaintiffs allegations,' °
the defendant also may elect to file a "partial" motion to dismiss' '-that is,
one directed to only some of the claims asserted in the complaint. 12 How-3
ever, Rule 12 does not specifically authorize the filing of such motions,'
and it is therefore unclear whether the defendant's submission of a partial
motion to dismiss prior to the expiration of its time for answering the comwithin which it must respond to any
plaint' 4 automatically extends the time
5
claims not addressed in its motion.
Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (observing that "a motion
to dismiss provides a valuable tool for narrowing and clarifying the scope of litigation").
10 In some cases it may be "difficult for the defendant adequately to prepare its answer within
the twenty days" ordinarily provided for under Rule 12(a). Redmond v. O'Sullivan Rubber Co.,
10 F.R.D. 519, 520 (W.D. Va. 1943). The filing of a pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b) may
alleviate this difficulty. See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc., 187
F.R.D. 578, 585 (D. Minn. 1999).
[U]nder the Federal Rules, [the defendant] was not required to file its Answer until a
ruling on its Motion to Dismiss had been issued.. If anything, [the defendant] was better positioned to formulate its defenses because of the Motion to Dismiss, as it obtained
eight additional months in which to serve and file an Answer.
Id.
See Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Helms, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (M.D. Ga. 2000) (noting "[a] defendant may move to dismiss a complaint or parts of a complaint"); Drewett v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 405 F. Supp. 877, 878 (W.D. La. 1975) (observing that a Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss "may be used to challenge the sufficiency of part of a pleading such as a single count or
claim for relief') (citation omitted); 4.' Elliott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp.
487, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating that "[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted as to portions of
a complaint").
12 See, e.g., Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 361 (D.
Mass. 2003) (noting "defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss certain of the ...plaintiffs'
claims on standing grounds"), afj'd, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Wade v. United States,
745 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (D. Haw. 1990) (observing that a motion to dismiss only some of the
plaintiffs claims "is properly characterized as one for partial dismissal").
13 See Scott L. Cagan, A "Partial"Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of'Civil Procedure 12: You Had Better Answer, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 202, 202 (1992) (stating that "[a] preliminary question which arises is whether a partial motion to dismiss is a motion 'permitted' under Rule 12") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)); John R. Knight, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(B): A ProceduralPrimer (Part1), 43 FED. LAW. 20, 20 (May 1996) (noting "[t]he
rule does not... speak to what is required in the common situation of a partial motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)"). Although the rule itself is silent on the matter, "no reported decision has expressed doubt over the propriety of a partial motion to dismiss." Cagan, supra, at 202.
14 A timely pre-answer motion to dismiss is one made prior to expiration of the defendant's
time for serving an answer. See Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977);
see also Psychological Res. Support Sys., Inc. v. Gerleman, 624 F. Supp. 483, 484 (N.D. Ga.
1985) (referring to the "twenty-day period for serving an answer, and thus for serving a motion
under Rule 12"); cf Cetenich v. Alden, 177 F.R.D. 94, 95 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that "[a] defendant avoids default by filing either an answer or a Rule 12 motion within twenty days of service of the complaint") (emphasis added).
15 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 202 ("assuming a partial motion to dismiss is an authorized
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This article explores that issue,' 6 on which there is relatively little
federal case law,' 7 and virtually no pertinent authority in the state courts, 8
many of which have procedural rules similar to Rule 12.19 The importance
of the issue stems primarily from the risk that a default judgment will be
entered against a defendant who fails to respond to some of the plaintiffs
claims. 20 In addition, a defendant found in default on this basis could be
precluded from asserting any compulsory counterclaims against the plaintiff.2'
motion, the critical issue is whether the drafters of Rule 12(a) intended that a partial motion to
dismiss operate to automatically enlarge a defendant's time to answer any unchallenged counts")
(emphasis added). See generally Atl. Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg, 318 F.2d 455, 459 (4th
Cir. 1963) (asserting that "the filing of [an] unallowable motion to dismiss could not automatically extend the time for answering").
16 The issue also arises when a plaintiff moves to dismiss fewer than all of the claims asserted in a defendant's counterclaim. See, e.g., Springfield v. United States, 88 F.3d 750, 751
(9th Cir. 1996). However, the analysis is essentially the same in both situations. See Cagan, supra note 13, at 205 n. 1. For the sake of simplicity this article discusses the issue only in the more
typical context in which it is the defendant moving to dismiss a portion of the plaintiff's complaint. Cf AAMC v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating "[i]n
this case, because [the plaintiff] seeks to dismiss [the defendant's] counterclaims, the court will
treat [the defendant's] Answer and the factual allegations therein the same way it would treat a
plaintiffs complaint in the usual motion to dismiss scenario").
17 See Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D. 219, 220 (N.D. 111.1997) (noting
that "[w]hether a party is required to answer unchallenged counts after a Rule 12(b) motion has
been filed as to certain, but not all, of the counts is an issue that has not received significant judicial attention"); Circuit City Stores v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. CIV. A. 92-CV-7394, 1994
WL 483463, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1994) (commenting that "[o]nly a few courts have directly
addressed this issue"); Josh Belinfante, To Answer or Not to Answer: The PartialMotion to Dismiss, 52 FED. LAW. 20, 21 (Nov./Dec. 2005) (stating "[t]he case law...provides more guidance
than Rule 12 itself offers, but little controlling authority exists").
1 See, e.g., Nelson G. Apjohn & Patrick F. Brady, Dispositive Motions, MASSACHUSETTS
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 6.2.1(b) practice note (Supp. 2002) (stating "[t]he
rules do not address whether a defendant who has moved to dismiss only some claims of a multicount complaint must file an answer with respect to the remaining counts within the 20-day period of Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(a).. .no Massachusetts decision addresses this issue").
19 See, e.g., Davis ex rel Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 747 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (asserting "Indiana's [Rule] 12 is based on and nearly identical to its federal counterpart");
Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc., 918 P.2d 17, 20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (observing
that "the language of [New Mexico] Rule 1-012 closely parallels that of its federal counterpart,
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53
P.3d 947, 950 n.2 (Utah 2002) (noting "Utah rule 12 is similar to federal rule 12"); cf Leichtman
v. Koons, 527 A.2d 745, 748 (D.C. 1987) (discussing "Federal Rule 12 and its identical District
of Columbia counterpart").
20 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 202 (observing that "practitioners... risk a default judgment
if they do not answer the unchallenged counts of the complaint in the event they file a partial motion to dismiss"); cf Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F. Supp. 1354, 1355-56 (D. Nev. 1993) (indicating
that a default judgment may be appropriate in "the absence of some affirmative action on the part
of a defendant which would operate as [a] bar" to the plaintiffs claim), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1994).
21 Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, the prevailing view is that "judgment by
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The article begins with a discussion of the view that the submission
of a partial motion to dismiss only suspends the time for responding to
those claims that are the subject of the motion.2 2 The article then discusses
the more prevalent view that the filing of such a motion tolls the time for
responding to all of the claims asserted in the complaint. 23 After analyzing
the relative merits of these competing views, 24 the article explores the practical implications of the existing split of authority, 25 and concludes that a
defendant (or, more typically, a defendant's attoMey) 26 filing a partial motion to dismiss should take additional steps to avoid defaulting on the
claims not addressed in the motion.27
II. THE VIEW THAT A PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ONLY
ENLARGES THE TIME TO ANSWER THE CLAIMS ADDRESSED IN
THE MOTION
Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. 28 is the most significant
early case addressing the impact of a partial motion to dismiss on the de-

default bars any claims of the defaulting defendant which were compulsory counterclaims in the
first proceeding." Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Carteret Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 38 n.l (1st Cir. 1987) (observing that what
"little authority" exists on this issue "is generally to like effect").
22 This view was advocated by one of the few commentators who have addressed the issue.
See Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 ("Rule 12(a) should be interpreted to require a defendant who
files a partial motion to dismiss to answer the unchallenged courts of a complaint within twenty
days of service of the summons and complaint.").
23 See Knight, supra note 13, at 20-21 (stating "[t]he majority (and better) view is that a partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) extends the time to answer or reply under Rule 12(a) in
toto"); Constance M. Boland & Lesley Szanto Friedman, Motions to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b):
Strategy and Tactics, 654 PLI/Lit 17, 21 (2001) (asserting "[a] pre-answer motion stops the clock
from running on the time to serve and file an answer or another responsive pleading pursuant to
Rule 12(a)(4), even for partial motions to dismiss.").
24 For a prior academic discussion of the competing views, see Cagan, supra note 13, at 204.
25 The resolution of any legal issue is likely to be "made difficult by [a] split of authority."
Blais Constr. Co. v. Hanover Square Assocs.-One, 693 F. Supp. 1412, 1413 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); see
also United States v. Johnson, 225 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (observing that a "split
in authority provides no particular guidance"); Pueblo de Cochiti v. United States, 647 F. Supp.
538, 542 (D.N.M. 1986) (noting "a split of authority...illustrate[s] that the law in [an] area is un-

clear").
26 See, e.g., Wyandotte Chems. Corp. v. City of Wyandotte, 321 F.2d 927, 929 (6th Cir.
1963) (stating "[diefendants... through their attorneys moved to dismiss the complaint"); United
States v. Farm Dairy Coop., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 769, 770 (N.D. W. Va. 1969) (same).
27 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (warning "[I]itigators should be prepared to handle
such situations and file the appropriate motions so that they will be able to protect their clients'
interests").
28 448 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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fendant's obligation to answer.29 The defendant in Gerlach moved to dismiss four of the six counts asserted in the plaintiffs' complaint.3 ° The

plaintiffs then moved for default judgment on the other two counts, 31 to
which the defendant submitted no response.
critical issue in the following terms:

32

The court described the

This motion raises the issue of whether [a] defendant must answer
certain counts contained in a complaint within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(a), even though the

remaining counts of the complaint are the subject of a pending motion to
dismiss and therefore need not be answered until ten days after notice of
the court's action on the motion, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(a)(1). 33

The defendant argued that it was entitled to narrow the scope of the
litigation, through the submission of a partial motion to dismiss, 34 to those
claims genuinely in dispute.35 The court agreed,36 but concluded that the
defendant's legitimate effort to narrow the claims at issue did not toll its

29 The Gerlach court itself found no prior case law addressing the issue. See id. at 1174.
31 See id.

31 See id. at 1170. In federal cases, obtaining a default judgment is "a two-step process."
New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). First, "[t]he Clerk of Court is authorized to
enter default when 'aparty against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend."' Ritts v. Dealers Alliance Credit Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1475, 1479
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). In the second step of the process, "a default
judgment may be obtained only by application to the court." Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52
F.3d 1139, 1152 n.ll (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE 55.03[2], at 55-27 (2d ed. 1994)).
32 See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174; cf Saw Mill Broadcasters, Inc. v. Moore, 561 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (explaining "[p]laintiff ...moves for entry of a default pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, because of the defendant's failure to answer specifically count 2 of the complaint"). See generally Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating "[i]n general, a non-answering defendant is subject to a default judgment, with the opportunity to challenge the judgment subsequently").
33 Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174.
34 In this regard, a motion to dismiss only some of the claims asserted in a complaint is, in
effect, a "motion to limit the scope of [the] action." Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs.,
592 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Wis. 1984); see also Atkinson v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 10 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 710, 716 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (describing the defendant's motion to dismiss a portion of the complaint as a "12(b)(6) motion.. .to narrow the scope of the action").
35 See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174; cf Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Moulton Props., Inc., No.
3:05cv4Ol/LAC, 2006 WL 2038554, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2006) (explaining that "[a] motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to eliminate counts or complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted") (emphasis added).
36 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 20 (observing that the Gerlach court "sympathized with
the defendant"); cf Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679, 1679
(N.D. Ill.
1981) (stating "the purpose of requiring a motion under 12(b) to be filed before service
of a responsive pleading is to determine the sufficiency of the complaint before requiring the parties to undergo the expense of discovery and further litigation").
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obligation to respond to the counts that were not the subject of its motion. 37
Articulating the reasoning underlying what has since become the minority
view on the issue, 38 the Gerlach court stated "[s]eparate counts are, by
definition, independent bases for a lawsuit and the parties are responsible to
proceed with litigation on those counts which are not challenged by a motion under [Rule] 12(b). 39
III. THE VIEW THAT A PARTIAL MOTION ENLARGES THE TIME
TO ANSWER ALL CLAIMS
Gerlach was not actually the first case to consider this question.40
Another federal district court dealt with the issue somewhat differently
several years earlier in Vohs v. Dickson.41 The defendants in Vohs moved
to dismiss two counts of the plaintiffs' three count complaint. 42 The plaintiffs, in turn, moved for default on the remaining count, to which the defendants apparently had not responded.4 3
37 See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174. The Gerlach court explained:
Defendant argues that it should be able to quickly narrow the scope of a lawsuit to
those claims really in conflict before the court. While this court fully agrees with defendant's argument, their [sic] proposition presents no reason for delaying the progress
of litigation with respect to those counts of a complaint which are not addressed by a
motion filed under F.R.C.P. 12(b).
Id.

38 See Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, at 572 (E.D. Va. 2002)

(characterizing the "Gerlach court's resolution of the issue" as the "minority approach"); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249-50 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting "Gerlach
... appears to be in the minority among the courts that have addressed this issue").
39 Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174; cf Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1950)
(describing the assertion of "separate and independent causes of action... as separate counts in the
same complaint"). But see Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (explaining "the fact that Plaintiff utilized separate counts to plead different legal theories
does not automatically make them separate and independent").
40 But see Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing Gerlachas "the only case on point" in 1990).
41 321 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
42 See id. at 815.
43 See id; cf Unger v. Nat'l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394 (3d Cir.
1991) (explaining that "[i]nstead of filing an answer, [the defendant] moved to dismiss count one
of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"); Young v. Medden,
No. Civ.A. 03-5432, 2006 WL 456274, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006) (stating "[b]ecause the
defendants filed an amended partial motion to dismiss with respect to the consolidated complaint,
the defendants have not filed a responsive pleading to any of the plaintiff's factual allegations");
Carney v. Snyder, No. C.A. 06-23 ERIE, 2006 WL 2372007, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2006)
("[d]efendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint, but have not filed an
answer to the remaining claims of the complaint"); Marcus v. Carrasquillo, 782 F. Supp. 593, 596
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Without specifically referring to Rule 12(a),44 the court noted that
the defendants' motion tolled their obligation to answer the counts they
were moving to dismiss.4 5 Because the contested portions of those counts
were an "integral part" of the remaining count,46 the court also held that the
defendants were not in default on the latter count.4 7 The court instead directed the defendants to answer all three counts after the plaintiffs amended
their complaint, 48 which the court permitted the plaintiffs to do in a final
effort to avoid dismissal of the counts that were the subject of the defendants' motion.49
However, the court did not hold that the defendants' obligation to

(M.D. Fla. 1992) (noting "[d]efendants have not answered the Complaint, but instead filed a motion to dismiss portions of the Complaint").
44 See generally Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 638
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (noting "neither the Rule nor the Advisory Committee Notes directly address
whether time to answer is extended for unchallenged claims when a Rule 12(b) motion is filed as
to only some claims"); Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174 (commenting that "F.R.C.P. 12 does not
explicitly address the issue of whether the filing of a motion under F.R.C.P. 12(b).. alters the
time within which the moving party must respond to claims in the complaint not addressed in the
motion").
45 See Vohs, 321 F. Supp. at 815 (concluding '[i]n view of the present situation, no answer is
yet required by defendants to Counts I and 1I").
46 Id.; (f Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., 147 F.R.D. 154, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating "[h]ere, defendant's motion to dismiss is directed to three of the four counts of the complaint. While each
count is founded upon a distinct legal theory, all of the counts sound in the same alleged basic
factual scenario").
47 See Vohs, 321 F. Supp. at 815; cf Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No. CIV-851404E, 1987 WL 18693, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1987). The GreaterBuffalo Press, Inc. court
found:
[Tlhe facts that the defendant has moved to dismiss ten claims... and that the cumulative nature of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint would, in essence, require the defendants to answer all of the allegations despite the fact that a rule 12 motion had been made as to some claims convince this Court that it would be unjust to
require the defendants to answer [the] four [remaining] claims at this time.
GreaterBuffalo Press, Inc., 1987 WL 18693, at *10.
48 See Vohs, 321 F. Supp. at 815; cf United States ex rel. Ackley v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 2d 395, 397 (D. Md. 2000) (providing that after the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss certain counts of the complaint, defendants were directed to file responsive pleadings to remaining counts not addressed in the motion).
49 It appears the plaintiffs had previously amended their complaint after the court granted a
Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement, and that the defendants' partial motion to dismiss
was, in effect, a renewal of a prior motion addressed to the original complaint. See Vohs, 321 F.
Supp. at 815. The court concluded that at least some of the deficiencies in the original complaint
were not cured by the initial amendment. See id. However, rather than dismiss the claims that
were the subject of the defendants' motion, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to file another
amended complaint, while cautioning that it would permit no further amendments "absent a clear
showing of excusable neglect on the part of plaintiffs to state with clarity and completeness all of
their claims." Id. at 815-16.
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respond to the third count was automatically tolled by their motion to dismiss the first two counts. 50 The court's ruling instead was based primarily
on pragmatic considerations 51 and, by analogy, 52 its discretionary authority
to "open a default" in order to allow the defendants to present "a justiciable
defense. 53 For this reason, the case offers relatively little guidance with
respect to whether or when other defendants filing partial motions to dismiss will be relieved of their obligation to respond to claims not addressed
in their motions. 54 Nevertheless, the case reflects a likely-and important 55-judicial aversion to defaulting a defendant for failing to respond to
such claims, 56 even though the rules arguably provide no other sanction for
50 See IOA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2682, at

15-16 & n.10 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Vohs as an example of a court exercising its "discretion to
grant additional time to a party to plead or otherwise defend") (emphasis added).
51 The court's ruling reflects the fact that:
a defendant's answer, including its affirmative defenses and counterclaims, often depends upon which claims survive the motion. Moreover, a defendant may be uncertain
how to answer certain paragraphs of the complaint, particularly the factual allegations
which logically support only the unchallenged counts of the complaint but which are
incorporated by reference in all of the causes of action.
Cagan, supra note 13, at 204; see, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 811 (2d Cir.
1940) (discussing an order "postponing the time for answering [an unchallenged] cause [of action] until the disposition of the [defendant's] motion for [partial] dismissal" because "the contents of its answer would depend to a large extent upon such disposition").
52 Although the plaintiff moved for "default" (as opposed to a default judgment) in connection with the count that was not addressed in the defendants' motion, it does not appear that a default was ever actually entered against the defendants. Vohs, 321 F. Supp. at 815; cf Johnson v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co. 140 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing that "entry of default under
Rule 55(a) must precede grant of a default judgment under Rule 55(b)") (discussing FED. R. CIv.
P. 55(a) & (b)).
53 Vohs, 321 F. Supp. at 815; see also Hamilton v. Edell, 67 F.R.D. 18, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(discussing courts' "broad discretion to set aside an entry of default in order to accomplish justice").
54 See generally Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the courts'
discretion to set aside default depends on circumstances of each case); Rasmussen v. W. E.
Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231, 233 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (observing that whether good cause exists for
setting aside a default turns on the peculiars of the particular case).
55 See generally Feeley v. Whitman Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 164, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). According to the Feeley court,
[d]ispositions of motions for entries of defaults and default judgments are left to the
sound discretion of the district court because it is in the best position to assess the individual circumstances of a given case and to evaluate the credibility and good faith of
the parties. ... In the exercise of this discretion, the district court must be mindful of
the strong policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits; defaults are generally disfavored and reserved for rare occasions.
Feeley, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
56 Cf Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Express Bank. Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
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that alleged violation of federal pleading requirements.57
The impact of a partial motion to dismiss was also addressed on
one other occasion before Gerlach was decided, in Business Incentives Co.
v. Sony Corp.5 8 The defendant in Business Incentives moved to dismiss
seven counts of the plaintiff's nine count complaint. 59 The plaintiff, in
turn, moved for summary judgment on the remaining two counts, 60 arguing
that it was entitled to judgment on those counts because the defendant
failed to address them in its motion or a separate answer. 6 1 The court de-

nied the plaintiffs motion, stating without elaboration that the defendant's
time to answer was automatically extended by the filing of its motion to
62

dismiss.

Despite the brevity of the Business Incentives court's analysis,63
most other courts that have addressed this issue agree with the conclusion
reached in that case. 4 Indeed, the contrary view expressed in Gerlach is a
relatively isolated one 65 that has received pointed criticism. 66 At least one

26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing that the entry of a default judgment would be a
"very harsh remedy" for a defendant's failure to answer claims that were not addressed in its motion to dismiss). See generally Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating "[a] default judgment, like a dismissal, is a harsh sanction which should usually be employed
only in extreme situations, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing").
57 See Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 556 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that
the rules provide no other remedy than default for this situation). But see Coyante v. P.R. Ports
Auth., 105 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1997) (indicating courts can impose less "extreme" sanctions than
default judgment against defendants who fail to answer).
58 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
59 See id. at 64.
60 See id The plaintiffs motion undoubtedly was premised on the fact that under federal
pleading rules, "[alverments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required ... are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading." FED. R. CIv. P. 8(d); see, e.g., Goodyke v.
United States, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,529, at 88,558 (D. Nev. May 14, 2003) (explaining "the plaintiff] has... filed a motion for summary judgment based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d),
wherein he claims that because the [defendant] failed to deny the averments in his original complaint, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
61 See Bus. Incentives, 397 F. Supp. at 64; cf Brady v. Marks, 7 F. Supp. 2d 247, 255
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (clarifying that though plaintiff filed, in form, a motion for summary judgment
based on defendants' alleged default, it is in effect "seeking a default judgment under Rule 55").
62 See Bus. Incentives, 397 F. Supp. at 64; cf Haack v. Max Internet Commc'ns, Inc., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,763, at 98,639 n. II (N.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that where the defendants "only moved to dismiss [the plaintiffs] securities fraud claims.. .they were not required to
file a responsive pleading" to the plaintiff's other claims).
63 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 27 n.1 (stating that the Business Incentives court held
"without reasoning that a partial motion to dismiss extends the time to file an answer") (emphasis
added); Cagan, supra note 13, at 203 (noting that the Business Incentives court reached its conclusion "without explanation").
64 See, e.g., Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 250 (W.D.N.Y.
1998); Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D.219, 221 (N.D. 11. 1997).
65 See Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 638 (N.D.
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other court, however, apparently agreed with the Gerlach court's conclusion that the filing of a partial motion to dismiss should not suspend the defendant's obligation to answer the remainder of the complaint."
The analysis in Gerlach was first explicitly rejected in Brocksopp
Engineering,Inc. v. Bach-Simpson Ltd. 68 and Brocksopp is now the case

"most often cited for the contrary proposition., 69 One of the defendants in
Brocksopp moved to dismiss some of the counts in the plaintiffs multicount complaint.7 ° When the original time for responding to the complaint
under Rule 12(a) subsequently expired, the clerk entered default against the
defendant on the counts it did not move to dismiss.7' The defendant moved

to vacate the default 72 or, in the alternative, for additional time to respond
to the complaint.7 3 The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion, arguing

Iowa 2006) (noting that "[n]o other court has adopted the Gerlach court's reasoning or ruling;
indeed, every court to consider the decision in Gerlach on this point has disagreed with and declined to follow it"); Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122
(D. Mass. 2001) (same); Belinfante, supra note 17, at 20 (observing "Gerlach stands alone in its
reasoning and its interpretation of Rule 12").
66 See, e.g., Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, at 572 (E.D. Va.
2002) (stating that the Gerlach minority approach is "unnecessarily formalistic at the expense of
sound policy and judicial economy").
67 See Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Express Bank. Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (relying on Gerlach in suggesting that Rule 12(a) requires a
defendant "to move or answer as to each count" of the complaint). In addition, "[a]t least one
commentator agrees with Gerlach's reasoning." Belinfante, supra note 17, at 20 (discussing Cagan, supra note 13).
68 136 F.R.D. 485 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
69 Ideal Instruments, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 639; see also Circuit City Stores v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., No. CIV A 92-CV-7394, 1994 WL 483463, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1994) (noting that the
Brocksopp court "took the opposite position" from "the Gerlach approach").
70 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486. The other Brocksopp defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint. See id.
71 See id. The clerk's entry of default presupposes that a defendant filing a partial motion to
dismiss cannot claim the benefit of the automatic extension of time granted to codefendants that
move to dismiss the entire complaint. See Hanley v. Volpe, 48 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Wis. 1970)
(holding that "the filing of .. a motion [to dismiss] by one defendant does not entitle another defendant to an automatic extension of the time in which to answer under Rule 12"); cf Floors-NMore, Inc. v. Freight Liquidators, 142 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that two
of the defendants who did not file motions to dismiss or answers were in default).
72 Rule 55(c) authorizes the court to set aside an entry of default for "good cause shown."
FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c); see also Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self Gov't Auth., 233 F. Supp. 2d 31,
33 (D.D.C. 2002). The practical effect of such a ruling is to extend the defendant's time to answer. See Lichtenstein v. Jewelart, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 511, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating "the granting of a Rule 55(c) motion 'rewards' a defendant with more time to respond to a complaint").
73 See Brocksopp Engg, 136 F.R.D. at 486; cf Murray v. Solidarity of Labor Org. Int'l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (explaining that "in response to a motion for entry
of default or default judgment, a reasonably competent attorney could be expected, for example,
to.. .move the court for an extension of time to move or plead in response to the Complaint"), reconsiderationdenied, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
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that a motion to dismiss fewer than all of the claims asserted in an action
does not enlarge v4the time within which the movant must respond to the remaining claims.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument (and, by extension, the
76
75
and vacated the clerk's entry of default.
Gerlach court's reasoning)
Describing the language of Rule 12(a) as clear, 7 the Brocksopp court held
that the filing of a partial motion to dismiss automatically enlarges the time
to submit an answer to the claims not addressed in the motion.7 8 Although
the rule is actually far from clear on the issue, 9 courts in several other
cases, including Finnegan v. University of Rochester Medical Center,80 Oil

74 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486; cf Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
No. CIV-85-1404E, 1987 WL 18693, at * 10 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1987) (indicating that "a defendant may be required to answer those claims against which no motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. rule 12 has been made").
75 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486 (declining to adopt "the Gerlachcourt's interpretation of rule 12(a)"); see also Cagan, supra note 13, at 203 (noting express disagreement between Brocksopp Engineeringand Gerlach).
76 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 487; see also Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 639 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (commenting that Brocksopp Engineering court did not hold defendant in default "for failure to answer otherwise unchallenged
claims, where the defendant had filed Rule 12(b) challenges to other claims"); cf Diallo v. City of
N.Y., No. 95 CIV. 5483 (DC), 1996 WL 288240, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1996) (concluding
plaintiff s motion for default judgment was frivolous where defendants "move[d] to dismiss most
of [the plaintiff's] claims," because defendants were "not required to answer the complaint while
their motion to dismiss [was] pending").
77 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486; cf IdealInstruments,434 F. Supp. 2d at 638.

[T]here is a strong implication from the language of Rule 12(a)(4) itself that the rule
extends the time to answer the complaint, as a whole, when a Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss is filed, even if the Rule 12(b) motion does not challenge all of the claims asserted in the complaint.
Ideal Instruments, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
78 See Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486; ef Bertaut v. Parish of Jefferson, No. CIV.A. 022104, 2002 WL 31528468, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2002) (stating that "[e]ven the filing of a partial motion to dismiss extends the defendant's time to answer the entire complaint"); Batdorf v.
Trans Union, No. C 00-0501 CRB, 2000 WL 635455, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2000) (same); Porter v. U.S. Dep't of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1995)
(holding "[t]he time extension applies to an answer for the entire complaint and not just to answers for the portions of the complaint that the motion addresses"), aff'd sub nom. Porter v. West,
99 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1996).
79 See Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D. 219, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1997). "Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)... does not specify whether a motion to dismiss must be for the entire complaint or only parts of the complaint in order to toll the time within which a defendant must answer." Id.; Cagan, supra note 13, at 202 (lamenting ambiguity over "whether the drafters of Rule
12(a) intended that a partial motion to dismiss operate to automatically enlarge a defendant's time
to answer any unchallenged counts").
80 180 F.R.D. 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Express National, Inc. v. D 'Alessandro,8 1 and most recently Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 2 have reached essentially the same
3
conclusion as the Brocksopp court.8
IV. THE REASONING UNDERLYING THE COMPETING VIEWS
A.

The Majority Approach May Avoid Duplicative Pleadingsand
Needless Discovery
The Brocksopp court and other critics of the Gerlach approach1

4

maintain that requiring a defendant to respond to claims not addressed in its
motion to dismiss would result in duplicative pleadings in the event the
motion is denied. 85 These courts and commentators also argue that the defendant's submission of an answer addressing only some of the plaintiffs
claims would create confusion over the proper scope of discovery while the
defendant's partial motion to dismiss is pending.86
B.

The DuplicativePleadingIssue

The first criticism of the Gerlach approach reflects a concern that
its application occasionally would result in precisely the type of "piecemeal" pleading 87 the drafters of Rule 12 were seeking to avoid 8 -"first, an
81 173 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
82 434 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
83 See, e.g., Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(relying on Brocksopp Eng 'g and Business Incentives in holding defendant's "filing of a motion
to dismiss the [plaintiff's] second cause of action suspended its time to defend against the first
cause of action as well"); Oil Express Nat'l, 173 F.R.D. at 220-21 (relying on Brocksopp and
Business Incentives in finding that "a partial motion to dismiss allows for altering the [time] limits of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) with respect to answering those claims not addressed in [the] motion"); Ideal Instruments, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (stating that it "finds the reasoning of the courts
rejecting Gerlach and embracing Brocksopp Engineeringto be far more persuasive").
84 See, e.g., Pestube Sys., Inc. v. HomeTeam Pest Def., LLC, 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,304, at 105,156 (D. Ariz. 2006) (rejecting as unpersuasive the Gerlach reasoning); Brocksopp
Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486 (referring to "legal commentators who suggest that the Gerlach approach has significant disadvantages").
85 See Oil Express Nat'l, 173 F.R.D. at 221; Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 486-87; Pestube Sys., 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,304, at 105,156.
86 See Oil Express Nat 'l,
173 F.R.D. at 221; Brocksopp Eng'g, 136 F.R.D. at 487.
87 See Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 639 (N.D.
Iowa 2006) (referring to "the 'piecemeal answer' rule proposed in Gerlach"); cf Schebel v. Charlotte County, 833 F. Supp. 889, 890 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (observing that "piecemeal pleadings are
inappropriate and unacceptable").
88 See generally Hasse v. Am. Photograph Corp., 299 F.2d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 1962) (stating
that the "general purposes of Rules 12 and 13... [are] to avoid piecemeal pleading and adjudica-
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answer to the unchallenged counts, and a second answer if the motion to
dismiss is successful on less than all of the counts" that were challenged in
the motion. 89 This in turn may require both the court and the plaintiff to
refer back and forth between two documents to determine precisely what
the defendant is asserting9 - a result that is, at a minimum, highly inefficient. 9'
However, unlike a defendant filing a motion to dismiss the entire
complaint,9 2 a defendant filing a partial motion to dismiss ultimately will be
required to file an answer even if its motion is granted. 93 In the latter situation, the defendant presumably could file a "partial" answer with its partial
motion to dismiss, 94 and then either supplement 95 or amend that answer as

tion"); Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 n.8 (D.D.C. 2002) (observing that Rule
12 "was designed to prevent.. piecemeal litigation").
99 Cagan, supra note 13, at 204; see also Batdorf v. Trans Union, No. C 00-0501 CRB,
2000
WL 635455, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2000) (observing that a rule requiring a defendant "to respond to ... those causes of action it did not move to dismiss" would result in "duplicative pleading in the event the motion to dismiss is denied and the [defendant] is then required to answer the
causes of action it had moved to dismiss").
90 See Elec. Design & Mfg., Inc. v. Dynamo, Ltd., No. 98 C 1913, 1998 WL 245993, at *2
(N.D. Ill. May 4, 1998).
91 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. tIl. 2001) (noting
"the inconvenience of having to flip back and forth between two pleadings to see just what is or is
not being placed at issue"); cf Ideal Instruments, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (discussing contention
that "requiring 'piecemeal' answers, when a defendant moves to dismiss only some of the claims
against it, is contrary to public policy and judicial economy").
92 See Lawhorn v. Atd. Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1962) (explaining after a motion
to dismiss has been filed, "there is no reason to file any other pleadings until the motion is acted
upon. If the motion is granted, no further pleadings will be necessary"); Ritts v. Dealers Alliance
Credit Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1997):
[I]f a Rule 12(b) motion is granted, it will lead to dismissal of the action and the party
who filed it will never have to file a response. In such an instance, therefore,... it
makes sense not to make the party file an answer until the Rule 12 motion is resolved.
Riuts, 989 F. Supp at 1480.
93 See Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638, at *1
(N.D. I1. Jan. 11, 1994) (noting that if motion to dismiss is granted, defendant will still have to
file an answer to the remaining claims); Cagan, supra note 13, at 202 (same); cf Miley v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., No. 105CV589LJMWTL, 2006 WL 146630, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 18, 2006)
(stating that if the court decides the "Motion to Dismiss Count VI should have been granted, the
parties will still be required to engage in all of the proceedings attendant to the remaining
Counts").
94 See, e.g., Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 F.2d 295, 296 (7th Cir. 1955) (explaining
that "defendant filed an answer to count 3 together with an amended motion to dismiss the balance of the complaint"); Benjamin-Coleman v. Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 752 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (noting "defendant... filed an answer which included affirmative defenses in response to the
counts not covered in [its] motion to dismiss."); Convenient Indus. of Am. v. CFM Franchising
Co., No. 93 C 4028, 1993 WL 387363, at **1-2 (N.D. Il. Sept. 24, 1993) (permitting the defendant to submit a partial answer concurrently with its partial motion to dismiss even though the
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necessary upon the resolution of its motion.96 If the defendant is required
to submit an amended answer that does not simply incorporate its initial,
partial answer by reference 97 (as effectively would be the case with a supplemental answer), 98 but instead is "retyped and filed so that it is complete
in itself,"99 the piecemeal pleading problems objectionable to Gerlach's
critics are significantly alleviated.' 00
applicable rules seem to "contemplate but a single answer to the complaint," because the court
"effectively acquiesced in the procedure followed by [the defendant]").
95 Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the filing of a supplemental
answer "when the matter to be set forth embraces other or further defense than the supplemental
pleader set forth in his original answer with respect to the cause[s] of action stated in the original
complaint." Ebel v. Drum, 55 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1944) (emphasis omitted) (discussing
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d)); cf Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating
"supplemental pleadings are deemed so useful in facilitating efficient judicial administration that
the Ninth Circuit has recommended that they be allowed 'as a matter of course"') (quoting Keith
v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988)).
96 See, e.g., Hughes v. Chesney, No. Civ. 3:CV-00-17, 2005 WL 2806688, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 26, 2005) (acknowledging that following resolution of the partial motion to dismiss, defendants will submit an answer to the remaining claims); Sliwa v. Hunt, 806 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D.
111.1992) (denying defendants' motions to dismiss and strike and ordering them "to answer all the
previously unanswered aspects of the Complaint"); Daum v. Jarecki, 123 F. Supp. 583, 584 (N.D.
I1. 1952) (explaining defendants' filings).
97 See, e.g., Froh v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., No. 04-C-646, 2005 WL 1263001, at *4 & n.2
(E.D. Wis. May 27, 2005) (ordering defendants whose motion to dismiss was denied to "file a
complete answer to the amended complaint, and...not incorporate [their prior partial] answer by
reference"); cf United States v. Feinberg, 372 F.2d 352, 363 (3d Cir. 1965) (noting "the answer
to the amended complaint referred back to and incorporated the averments of the original answer").
98 See, e.g., Magee v. McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5, 8 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (stating "[a]ll averments
and defenses filed by defendant by his original answer are included in and reiterated by this supplemental answer"); Klimek v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 155, 158 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the defendant's supplemental answer and that it incorporated initial answer as well as asserting two new affirmative defenses); see also Baker v. Elmwood Distrib., Inc., No. 83 C 0215,
1989 WL 18215, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1989) (commenting that "Rule 15(d) contemplates a
pleading that adds to a previous pleading" meaning the supplemental pleading includes the earlier
allegations).
99 Do-Nguyen v. Clinton, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 2000); see also Sopis v.
Tsagaris, No. 85 Civ. 0215 (CSH), 1987 WL 15117, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1987). "An
amended pleading must stand on its own feet and be all-inclusive. That is the only way to avoid
uncertainties in the pleading and the proofs." Sopis, 1987 WL 15117, at *1. In addition,
[a]n amended pleading completely supersedes the original pleading, and once a pleading is "amended," the only issues before the Court are the ones raised in the text of the
A supplement, on the other hand, merely adds to the informaamended pleading ....
tion presented in the pleading already pending before the Court rather than completely
replacing it.
Angel v. United States, No. 8:03CR176T30MAP, 2005 WL 3087869, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17,
2005).
100 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 280 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting
that submission of "a hill-blown self-contained amended pleading" would avoid "a kind of
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This approach would not unduly burden the defendant,' 0' who
should have little difficulty preparing and filing a partial answer with its
partial motion to dismiss ° 2 or, if necessary,' ° 3 amending that answer when
the court subsequently rules on its motion. ° 4 As one commentator explained, the piecemeal pleading problem "can be alleviated by the simple
filing of an amended answer upon the disposition of the motion. With today's computer technology, amending an answer is hardly a cumbersome
task.' 05 In the face of this persuasive assertion, 0 6 the threat of duplicative
pleadings does not provide a particularly compelling argument for relieving
a defendant of the obligation to answer any claims that are not addressed in

its partial motion to dismiss.'0 7
C.

The Scope of Discovery Issue

The other principal criticism of the Gerlach approach is more significant.' 08 Proceeding with litigation while a partial motion to dismiss is

patchwork pleading, in which more than one document must be examined to see the totality of the
responding party's pleading"); cf Walker v. City of Charleston, 412 F. Supp. 2d 600, 601 (S.D.
W. Va. 2006) (explaining "incorporation by reference... allows confusing piecemeal pleadings").
'o' See Walker, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (pointing out that repleading causes little if any inconvenience to counsel); Bresson v. Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 338, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (observing "repleading is a simple matter").
102 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 (explaining "it is hardly burdensome for a defendant to
answer the unchallenged counts."). But see Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 638 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (commenting that Rule 12 is not cast "in terms of
individual answers to separate counts or claims").
103 The defendant presumably would need to amend its initial answer only if its partial motion to dismiss was denied in whole or in part, in order to respond to the claims or counts it unsuccessfully moved to dismiss. See Batdorf v. Trans Union, No. C 00-0501 CRB, 2000 WL
635455, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2000).
104 See, e.g., Schillinger v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 425 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing an attorney's use of an initial pleading "as a word processing template" when preparing an
amended pleading); see also Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 306 F. Supp. 884, 887 (N.D. Ga. 1969)
(stating "[t]he amended answer merely supplements the answer as originally drawn").
105 Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 (emphasis omitted); see also K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand
Corp., 203 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (noting "[p]leadings are easily amended").
106 Cf Edward D. Cavanagah, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in Pace,
173 F.R.D. 565, 570(1997). "Dramatic advances in technology [have] made it possible - and efficient - for individuals to locate, store, access and utilize mountains of data. Word processing
[has] significantly lowered the cost of preparing pleadings, discovery requests, briefs and other
court papers." Id.
107 See, e.g., Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No. CIV-85-1404E, 1987 WL
18693, at * 10 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1987) (noting regardless of the court's decision on motions to
dismiss, "[i]nterest in moving forward in the litigation provides reason to compel an answer on
the claims which will surely survive").
108 See, e.g., Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 90 Civ. 2823 (CSH), 1991 WL 221110,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1991). The court stated:
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pending may indeed raise difficult issues concerning the proper scope of
discovery.1° 9 In part for this reason, some courts have suggested that such
motions ordinarily should be resolved before any discovery is conducted." 10
By suspending the defendant's obligation to answer and, at least in some
cases, the commencement of discovery"' pending resolution of a partial
motion to dismiss,11 2 the majority approach may save both parties the ex-

Were it necessary to serve an answer in piecemeal fashion, as Gerlach suggests, a procedural thicket would emerge. Thorny questions would arise as to how the case should
proceed pending resolution of the motion... Should discovery proceed with regard to
some of the [case], and then await the "arrival" of the other claims...? Such an approach is inefficient.
Id.

109 See Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. IIl. 1997) (noting

"[1]egal commentators have suggested that not reading Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) as extending the time
to answer, in the presence of a partial Rule 12(b) motion,.. could cause confusion over the proper
scope of discovery during the motion's pendency") (discussing 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1346, at 181 (2d ed. 1990)). Com-

pare Carr v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (commenting that
the decision on the motion to dismiss will limit "the scope of... additional discovery") with Bazewick v. Chao, 174 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that because the same evidence can be used to support both claims addressed in the motion to dismiss and those not addressed therein, granting the motion would not limit the scope of discovery).
110 See, e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)
(commenting that "[flacial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should...be resolved before discovery
begins") (footnote omitted); Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the Chudasama court's
stay discovery when even a partially disconclusion that "courts should, whenever possible ....
positive motion is pending"); cf Special Event Entm't v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 72,
75 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that a motion to dismiss "tests only the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and is properly made before the answer or discovery") (emphasis added).
III In most jurisdictions, the filing of a Rule 12(b) motion does not automatically stay discovery pending resolution of the motion. See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 331,
336 & n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo.
1969). Nevertheless, "such stays are granted with substantial frequency," In re Sulfuric AcidAntitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. at 336, and are particularly appropriate "where the likelihood that such
motion may result in a narrowing.. .of discovery outweighs the likely harm to be produced by the
delay." 19th Street Baptist Church v. St. Peters Episcopal Church, 190 F.R.D. 345, 349 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
112 See Pompano-Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,991, at 90,633 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (asserting "[d]iscovery on the merits should normally await
disposition of any pre-answer motions challenging the legal sufficiency of the complaint, in order
to minimize abuse of the discovery process for... a groundless claim") (citation omitted). Furthermore,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a).. requires defendants to answer the Complaint within twenty days
of service thereof, unless they choose to respond by a motion permitted under said
Rule. Obviously, by requiring a response to the Complaint within so short a period of
time, Rule 12(a) does not contemplate that discovery will ordinarily be taken prior to
service of a response.
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pense of exploring the factual predicate for claims that have no legal
merit. 113 As the court in Ideal Instruments explained:
In multi-claim litigation in which a party mounts a Rule
12(b) challenge to only some of the claims against it, it
makes no sense to impose upon the parties some kind of
"dual-track" litigation involving an answer and further
proceedings on some claims, while other claims are subject
to review on the motion to dismiss. The inefficiencies for
both the parties and the court as well as the potential for
confusion and unnecessary procedural convolutions
posed
4
by such "dual-track" litigation are obvious. 1

D.

The Minority Approach DiscouragesDilatory Tactics

The principal advantage of the Gerlach approach is that it discourages defendants from filing partial motions to dismiss solely as a tactic to
delay the adjudication of their cases.1 5 Precisely because Rule 12(b) motions do interrupt discovery in many cases, 1 6 (and also because they are
Sierra Foods, Inc. v. Haddon House Food Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-6841, 1991 WL 95287, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1991).
113 See United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003)
(stating "[m]otions under Rule 12(b) provide litigants with a fundamental procedural safeguard
and prevent burdensome discovery in meritless cases"); Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 551
(6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the use of a Rule 12(b) motion "to narrow the claims at the onset of
the case, rather than engaging in extensive discovery"); Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1368 (noting
"[i]f the district court dismisses a nonmeritorious claim before discovery has begun, unnecessary
costs to the litigants and to the court system can be avoided").
114 Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 639 (N.D. Iowa
2006). One commentator maintains that even under the minority approach, "a defendant can always move for a stay of discovery, in its entirety or with respect only to the moved-upon claims."
Cagan, supra note 13, at 204; see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287,
289 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (describing a defendant who "moved to stay both discovery and answer
pending resolution of a motion to dismiss"); Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., 147 F.R.D. 154, 161-62
(N.D. 111.1993) (explaining that defendant seeks stay based on filing a partial motion to dismiss).
However, "a request to stay all discovery pending resolution of a motion is rarely appropriate
where resolution of the motion will not dispose of the entire case." Simpson v. Specialty Retail
Concepts, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
115 See Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, 572 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(noting "the minority approach has the advantage of preventing a party from using a partial Rule
12(b) motion to delay adjudication of the remaining portion of the action"); cf Tingley Sys., Inc.
v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122 (D. Mass. 2001) (indicating that "achieving a
more expedited processing of the unaddressed counts" is an "advantage [of] the Gerlach approach").
116 See, e.g., Maruani v. AER Servs., Inc., No. 06-176(MJD/AJB), 2006 WL 2666302, at *4
(D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2006) (postponing discovery until resolution of partial motion to dismiss);
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granted relatively infrequently), 1 7 a defendant's submission of a partial
motion to dismiss occasionally accomplishes "little except to delay the real
commencement of litigation."'1 8 The presumptive availability of preanswer discovery under the majority view 19 may not adequately address
this problem:
Although one might argue that ... discovery may proceed
in the absence of an answer, a plaintiff can commence
more meaningful, narrowly tailored discovery after review-

ing a defendant's answer. Clearly, more extensive and focused discovery occurs after service of the answer, which
informs the plaintiff of the defendant's admissions, denials,
20
and defenses. 1
By making it clear that the filing of a partial motion to dismiss will

Gollehon Farming v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1161 (D. Mont. 1998) (noting that the
court "suspended all further discovery pending resolution of [defendant's] Motion to Dismiss"),
aff'd 207 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Weiss v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 729 F. Supp. 144, 148
(D.D.C. 1990) (same).
117 See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir.
2005) (stating
"[m]otions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted"); Ga. ex rel. Bowers v.
Dairymen, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1580, 1582 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (commenting that "Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are typically denied"); cf Lugo v. Senkowski, 114 F Supp. 2d 111, 113
(N.D.N.Y. 2000). "Where a motion to dismiss is made prior to any discovery or the filing of an
answer, the court is loath to dismiss the complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff is unlikely
to prevail, unless the defendant can demonstrate that plaintiff is unable to prove facts which
would entitle him to relief." Lugo, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
l18Washington v. City of Evanston, 535 F. Supp. 638, 639 n.2 (N.D. Il1. 1982); see also Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 (noting that "[a] partial motion to dismiss often has the practical effect
of impeding, often paralyzing, the progress of discovery, and the Rules contemplate a steady -- if
not swift -- discovery pace"); cf Cohn, 147 F.R.D. at 162 (characterizing the defendant's request
for a stay pending resolution of its partial motion to dismiss as an attempt "to stall or delay the
inevitable search for the truth, as provided by the federal discovery rules").
119 See Hulsey v. Gunn, 905 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (discussing the plaintiffs
ability to "seek consent of the opposing party or, if that is not forthcoming, seek leave of Court to
conduct pre-answer discovery"); In re Am. Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., 22 F.R.D. 504,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (commenting that "amended Rule 26.. .was framed for the express purpose
of allowing discovery before a responsive pleading had been filed") (discussing FED. R. CIv. P.
26).
120 Cagan, supra note 13, at 204; cf McLernon v. Source Int'l, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1422, 1430
(E.D. Wis. 1988) (observing that "discovery may proceed in earnest" once "defendants who have
not yet answered.. frame responsive pleadings"); Seman v. Leibovitz, 1 F.R.D. 280, 281 (E.D.
Pa. 1940) (explaining that "it is somewhat difficult to know exactly what is relevant until some
progress has been made toward developing the issues... [s]o normally the discovery would take
place after the answer has been filed and the issues have been to that extent defined") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). See generally Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 74
F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1324 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (noting that the answer will help identify material
and relevant facts).
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not impede discovery,12 ' the minority approach may discourage defendants
22
from filing such motions in order to delay the adjudication of their cases.
Nevertheless, the emerging consensus 123 holds that any dilatory tactics can
be sufficiently deterred by the threat of Rule 1 sanctions. 124 Indeed, where
a dilatory Rule 12(b) motion evokes such sanctions, 125 the transgressing de121 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 (stating that "this interpretation will promote efficient

discovery by enabling plaintiffs to immediately commence narrowly tailored discovery and by
preventing defendants from unnecessarily delaying the progress of the lawsuit"); ef Cohn, 147
F.R.D. at 162 (asserting that "staying discovery is particularly inappropriate in [the] case [of a
partial motion to dismiss] because even if defendant were successful, defendant's motion would
not be dispositive of the entire case"); Powell v. City of Chicago, 94 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (N.D.
111.2000). The court in Powell v. City of Chicago stated,
The court's decision to allow plaintiff to go forward rests in part on the fact that
the instant partial motion to dismiss would not dispose of the entire case. Because the
parties will have to conduct discovery regardless of the outcome of the instant motion,
it would be premature to bar plaintiff at this early stage from [proceeding].
Powell, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
122 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 ("requiring a defendant to answer the unchallenged
counts discourages the filing of a partial motion to dismiss solely as a dilatory tactic, and encourages expedient discovery"); cf Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D.
Mo. 1969) (noting that "fil[ing] an answer, even where a motion to dismiss has been
filed,... facilitate[s] discovery").
123 See Pestube Sys., Inc. v. Hometeam Pest Defense, LLC, 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,304, at 105,156 (D. Ariz. 2006) (observing that recent authority opposes Gerlach's approach);
Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (commenting that "every case since the 1978 Gerlach decision
rejected its holding").
124 See, e.g., Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, 572-73 (E.D.
Va. 2002) ("any potential abuses or dilatory tactics which the minority approach seeks to prevent
can.. .be guarded against under the majority approach through the use of Rule 11 sanctions to deter abuse"); Okaya (USA), Inc. v. United States, 25 ITRD 2278, 2284 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)
(commenting that "[a] more considered solution might be to hold that a partial Rule 12(b) motion
expands the time for answering the entire pleading, relying on the prospect of Rule 11 sanctions
to deter the abusive use of such a motion") (quoting 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1346 (3d Cir. 1998)); Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21
(stating that dilatory tactics can be dealt with under Rule 11) (quoting Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at
572).
125 See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Sona Distribs., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (sanctioning the defendant because of the "Court's finding that the motion to dismiss was a
frivolous dilatory tactic intended to harass the Plaintiffs and not asserted with good faith") (applying FED. R. CIv. P. 11), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1512 (11" Cir. 1988); Steele v. Morris, 608 F. Supp. 274
(S.D. W. Va. 1985). The Steele court stated:
[H]ad Defendant's counsel made a reasonable inquiry into "both the facts and the law"
before filing the motion to dismiss ... he would have been quickly dissuaded from filing that motion. Having done so, the Defendant has seriously delayed the prosecution
of this action in that it has been over two months since the filing of the complaint, and
because no answer has been filed, the issues have yet to be joined and pretrial deadlines established. This is precisely the type of unnecessary delay Rule 11 is designed
to avoid.
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fendant might be denied the benefit of the automatic enlargement of time to
answer otherwise provided for in Rule 12(a) on the ground that "a litigant
26
should not be permitted to gain an advantage from a sanctionable filing."'1
27
Alternatively, a court unwilling to impose Rule 11 sanctions
could address a defendant's tactical delay under the provision of Rule 12(a)
authorizing courts to "order an answer to be filed at a time other than after
the motion to dismiss has been denied."' 128 Thus, despite the absence of
any procedural rules expressly authorizing courts to shorten the answer period,1 29 a court could avoid any prejudicial delay by directing the defendant
to file an answer (and proceed with discovery) 30 while its partial motion to
Steele, 608 F. Supp. at 277 (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (1983 amendment)).
126Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "a
frivolous motion buys the movant no time"); cf Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension
Fund v. R.W. Armine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002) (commenting on the
court's authority to "dismiss a case when faced with dilatory tactics by the plaintiff' as well as "to
enter default judgment when a defendant fails to defend its case appropriately").
127 The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions has been described as an "extraordinary remedy."
Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, a
court may be hesitant to impose such sanctions "absent egregious conduct." Levy v. City of
N.Y., 726 F. Supp. 1446, 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Stanley v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch,
296 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (acknowledging the court's reluctance to impose Rule
II sanctions). However, the potential imposition of Rule 11 sanctions "is not the only means
available to a court to correct and sanction inappropriate litigation conduct." Ritter v. Clinton
House Restaurant, 64 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D.N.J. 1999).
128 Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 237 F.R.D. 613, 617 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (discussing
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(4)); see also Rossi Distribs., Inc. v. Lavazza Premium Coffees Corp., No.
01 C 9271, 2002 WL 31207324, at *2 (N.D. 111.Oct. 2, 2002) (noting that "Rule 12(a)(4)...gives
this court discretion to fix a different filing date"); cf MedRehab, Inc. v. Evangeline of Natchitoches, Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-1663, 1998 WL 671287, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 24, 1998) (stating
"[u]nless a different time is fixed by court order, responsive pleadings must be served within ten
days of notice of denial of a Rule 12(e) motion") (emphasis added).
129 See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing a
court's ability, pursuant to FRCP 6:b) to enlarge the time allowed under certain rules but the lack
of authority to shorten the time); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 853, 854 (D. Mass. 1973) (pointing out that "[p]laintiffs offer no authority for their proposition that.. .the court has power to
shorten the period in which a defendant may file an answer"), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1158 (1st Cir.
1973). But see Nalty v. Nalty Tree Farm, 654 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (S.D. Ala. 1987) (commenting
that "excessive delay in urgent cases... can be obviated by applying to the court to shorten the
time. See Rule 6(b).") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 6 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment)).
130 Cf.Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969). According to the Everett court,
[W]hile Rule 12(a).. temporarily relieves [a] defendant of the duty to answer until on
or before 10 days after notice of the court's action on a motion to dismiss.. [such] motions do not suspend the discovery process. Therefore, the better practice is timely to
file an answer, even where a motion to dismiss has been filed, in order further to facilitate discovery.
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dismiss is still pending.' 3 1 Indeed, Rule 12(a) enables the court to compel
the defendant to answer while its motion is pending simply by deferring
consideration of the motion until the time of trial, 32 and courts often expe-

dite the adjudication of cases in precisely this manner."'
E.

The Majority View is More Consistent with Rule 12 'sLanguage

While there may be room for debate on the issue,' 34 the language
and structure of Rule 12 appear to be more consistent with the majority

131 See, e.g, Fong v. United States, 300 F.2d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1962) (discussing procedural
history and stating "[the defendant] renewed his motion to dismiss as against the first count of the
amended complaint, and ... the Trial Court postponed ruling on his motion and required his answer"); Hill, 237 F.R.D. at 617 (explaining that "because this Court has affirmatively ordered Defendant to file an answer at a time fixed by this Court, any...motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12 shall not alter Defendant's affirmative obligation to answer Plaintiffs'
amended complaint"); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Safrabank (Cal.), No. 90-4194-R, 1991 WL
173784, at *I (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 1991) (holding that a magistrate judge properly "directed the
defendants to file their answers prior to the disposition of [their] pending motions [to dismiss]," in
part because the court's resolution of the motions would not dispose of the entire case); In re
Longhorn Sees. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 263 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (requiring defendants to "answer
the complaints even though their pre-answer motions were still under consideration").
132 Rule 12(a) requires the defendant to submit its answer within 10 days of the court's decision to "postpone[] its decision [on the motion] until the trial on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(4)(A); see also United States v. Snider, 779 F.2d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1985). "In the present case the court did not explicitly postpone disposition of the motion to dismiss until trial on
the merits. If the court had done this, Rule 12(a)(1) would have required the [defendant] to serve
a responsive pleading within 10 days after notice of the court's action." Id.; Ritts v. Dealers Alliance Credit Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (explaining that "once a party
files.. .a [Rule 12(b)] motion, the party does not have to respond to the complaint until ten days
after the court either denies the motion or defers its consideration until trial") (emphasis added);
Whayne v. Kan., 980 F. Supp. 387, 391 (D. Kan. 1997) (same).
133See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (directing the
defendant to "file his answer in compliance with ...Rule 12(a)(4)(A) within ten days" where the
court was "reserv[ing] ruling in part" on the defendant's motion to dismiss); Bailey v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (C.D. Ill.
1979) (ordering that "decision
on the motion for partial dismissal is reserved" and directing defendant...to file its answer herein
within ten (10) days"); Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1220 (W.D.Va. 1975) (reserving
judgment on the motion to dismiss and ordering defendant "to file their answers to plaintiff's
amended complaint within fifteen (15) days from the date of this decision"); Se. Promotions, Inc.
v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (ordering an answer and reserving ruling on
motion to expedite hearing), qff'd, 486 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on othergrounds, 420 U.S.
546 (1975).
134Compare Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 ("requiring an answer within twenty days of service of the summons and complaint is consistent with the Rules' language that a plaintiff may
commence discovery against a party after service of the complaint and summons upon that party,
and not after the defendant's filing of an answer") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 33(a) and 34(b))
with Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Express Bank. Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing that requiring the defendant to answer claims not
addressed in a partial motion to dismiss "is not required by the plain language" of Rule 12(a)).

2008]

PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

view 135 than with the Gerlach court's approach. 136 In Baker v. Universal

Die Casting,Inc., 3 7 for example, the plaintiffs moved for default judgment
on the ground that the defendants were seeking to dismiss only some of the
plaintiffs' claims and failed to file a responsive pleading with regard to
their other claims. 138 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion.' 39 Because a

motion asserting a defense listed in Rule 12(b) ordinarily must be made before the defendant files its answer, 140 the court concluded that Rule 12(a)

necessarily contemplates that the submission of "any motion to dismiss"
asserting such a defense' 4'-including one that withholds other potential
due until
defenses 142_ "results in the responsive pleadings not becoming
143

ten days after notice of the court's action" on the motion.
Indeed, Rule 12(a) ordinarily enlarges the time for answering when
the defendant submits any pre-answer motion permitted under Rule 12,144

135 See Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 639 (N.D.
Iowa 2006). "[Tlhe language of Rule 12(a) plainly contemplates that a Rule 12(b) motion will
extend the time to answer as to all claims, even those not challenged in the Rule 12(b) motion."
Id.
136 See Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(commenting that "the language of Rule 12 itself does not support [the minority] position").
137725 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
138 See id. at 420.
139Seeid. at421.
140 See Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d
924, 931 n. 1
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that "defendants generally must bring Rule 12(b) motions before answering"); Russell v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654, 659 (E.D. La. 2004) (stating
general rule that a 12(b) motion should be filed before the answer).
141 Baker, 725 F. Supp. at 420.
142 See generally Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Lujan, 797 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.

1992), aff 'd, 40 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Daingerfieldcourt stated:
When a party brings a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, it must consolidate all defenses or objections which it could bring under the rule. If a defense or objection
which the rule permits is omitted, the party generally may not thereafter make a motion
based on that defense or objection. One of the exceptions to this rule of consolidation
of defenses or objections, however, is the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted (i.e., a Rule 12(b)(6) defense). If a party fails to raise this defense, it is not waived.
Id. (citations omitted).
143 Baker, 725 F. Supp. at 420; see also Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 90 CIV.
2823 (CSH), 1991 WL 221110, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1991) (stating "[alny motion.. will suspend the time to answer any claim").
144 See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Safrabank (Cal.), No. 90-4194-R, 1991 WL 173784, at *1
(D. Kan. Aug 28, 1991) (noting "[o]rdinarily, a defendant need not file an answer until ten days
after the court has ruled on any motions permitted by Rule 12"); Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp.
789, 791 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (observing that the motions that enlarge the time for answering under
Rule 12(a) "are, of course, listed in Rule 12(b) through (f)").
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including a Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement 145 or a Rule 12(f)
motion to strike. 146 In many cases, these latter two motions (and particularly a motion to strike) 147 would address fewer than all of the claims asserted in a complaint,14 as reflected in the fact that Rule 12(a) expressly
extends the time to answer when a Rule 12(e) motion is granted,149 and at
least arguably does so by implication when a Rule 12(f) motion is granted

as well.'

50

145 See M.E. Aslett Corp. v. Crosfield Elecs., Inc., No. 86 Civ. 3549-CSH, 1987 WL 7023, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1987) (noting that Rule 12(a) "provides for an extension of time for responsive pleadings until ten days after notice of the court's denial of a Rule 12(e) motion"); see
also Faske v. Radbill, 7 F.R.D. 234, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Faske judge stated: "I
have.. granted, in part, defendants' motion for a more definite statement.. under Rule 12(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. .defendants will automatically be allowed ten days after the
service of the more definite statement or bill of particulars within which to file their answer."
Faske, 7 F.R.D. at 236-37.
146 See Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1101 (7th Cir. 1994) (pointing to Rule 12(a)(4)'s
time extension for a responsive pleading where the party files a motion to strike a pleading).
[l]t has been the general policy of this Court to treat the service of a motion to strike a
pleading as a motion permitted under Rule 12 for the purpose of enlarging the time
limits for further pleading. This policy is certainly in keeping with the spirit of the
Rules.
Hollingsworth v. Chrysler Corp., 135 A.2d 724, 724-25 (Del. Super. Ct. 1957).
147 See Battle v. Nat'l City Bank of Cleveland, 364 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (explaining that only those portions of a pleading which are objectionable should be stricken); cf
Carone v. Whalen, 121 F.R.D. 231, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (commenting that "[a]lthough the invocation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) to strike an entire complaint is rare.. .such an action is not unknown").
148 See, e.g.. Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332
n.92 (11 th Cir. 1998) (discussing the defendants' "Rule 12(f) motion to strike some of the general
allegations from the complaint"); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (noting defendants' motion to strike); Moore v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 557, 559
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (identifying defendant's request for "plaintiff to provide a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) for Counts I and It"); Towers Fin. Corp. v. Solomon, 126 F.R.D. 531, 536
(N.D. 111.1989) (discussing defendants' motion to provide a more definite statement as to all
counts). See generally Cagan, supra note 13, at 205 n.l. "[P]artial motions are sometimes
brought pursuant to.. Rule 12(e) (motion for move definite statement); and Rule 12(f) (motion to
strike)." Id.
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(B); see also Lewis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 562
(LAK) (THK), 2004 WL 2093467, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2004) (explaining the procedural
ramifications of filing a 12(e) motion, stating if "the court grants the motion, the answer must be
filed within ten days after the more definite statement"); Schlenker v. Thorne, Neale & Co., 9
F.R.D. 473, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (discussing the portion of Rule 12(a) that "refers...to the extension of time allowed, if the court grants a motion for more definite statement, to file a responsive
pleading").
150 See, e.g., Ravenswood Hosp. Med. Ct. v. N.J. Carpenter's Health Fund, No. 91 C 3593,
1991 WL 203743, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1991) (granting defendant's motion to strike portions
of the plaintiffs complaint and directing defendant to file an answer); see also 5B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1346, at 46-47
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If a defendant also can move to dismiss only some of the plaintiff's
claims under Rule 12,' " it makes little sense to require the defendant to respond to the remaining claims when it could avoid that obligation simply
153
52
by designating its motion-however improperly' -as a motion to strike
(or perhaps as a motion to "strike or dismiss"), 54 rather than as a partial
motion to dismiss.'5 5 In fact, because "the essential functions of a motion
to strike and a motion to dismiss are practically identical, ' 5 6 the court itself
might elect to treat a partial motion to dismiss as a motion to strike157 or "as
a motion to strike or dismiss certain paragraphs of [the] plaintiff's com(3d ed. 2004) (observing that the "extension of time provision in Rule 12(a) does not apply to the
grant of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f)," although the rule's "failure to deal with this situation probably is simply an unintended omission").
151See, e.g., Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638, at *1
(N.D. Ill.
Jan It, 1994) (noting that the rule "does not require that the motion go to all of the
claims in a complaint"). Furthermore,
A party moving under Rule 12(b)(6) may challenge the sufficiency of one, some, or all
of the claims for relief contained in a pleading; the overall action is not directly at issue... Nothing in the language of [the] rule suggests that its effect and application
should turn on whether only one or some claims... or the entire action is at issue.
United States v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223, 233-34 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
152 See Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497, 504 (C.D. Il. 1982). "[A]
motion to strike under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).. .is neither an authorized nor a proper way to procure
the dismissal of part of the complaint." Id.
153 See, e.g., Ball v. Irving Airchute Co., 7 F.R.D. 173, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 1945) (explaining
that "[d]efendant has yet made no responsive pleading but seeks relief by motion to strike out two
of the alleged causes of action"); see also Wray v. Edward Blank Assocs., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 498,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "Technically, motions to strike are not proper methods of disposing of part
or all of a complaint. However, to avoid being restricted by the technical form of common-law
practice, which the federal rules have abandoned, courts may treat motions to strike as motions to
dismiss." Id. (citations omitted).
154See, e.g., Selep v. City of Chicago, 842 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (stating that
defendants' motion to strike and/or dismiss portions of the complaint is before the court); Astro
Limousine Serv., Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 647 F. Supp. 193, 193-94 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) (noting why the case is before the court); Darling & Co. v. Klouman, 87 F.R.D. 756,
757 (N.D. 11. 1980) (explaining that "[d]efendants have moved to strike and dismiss Counts I
through V [of the plaintiffs six-count complaint] for various alleged pleading deficiencies, or in
the alternative to obtain a more definite statement").
155 See, e.g., Balabanos v. N. Am. Inv. Group, Ltd., 708 F. Supp. 1488, 1494 (N.D. 11. 1988)
(discussing a "motion to strike [that] should more properly be labeled a motion to dismiss the
claims raised in [certain] paragraphs" of the complaint); Link v. Kallaos, 56 F. Supp. 304, 305
(E.D. Mo. 1944) (same).
156 Ham v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 153, 154 (N.D. Okla. 1968); see also Belton v.
Air Atlanta, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 28, 28-29 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (observing that a "motion to strike
portions of [a] plaintiffs complaint" is "similar in effect to a motion to dismiss").
157See, e.g., Freedman v. La.-Pac. Corp.. 922 F. Supp. 377, 383 n.3 (D. Or. 1996). "Defendants refer to their motions as 'motions to dismiss'; however .... they shall be construed as 'motions to strike' under Fed. R Civ. Pro. 12(f), instead of 'motions to dismiss' under Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(b)(6)." Id.
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plaint,"1 58 thereby eliminating any doubt that the time for submitting
a re59
sponsive pleading was extended by the service of the motion. 1
V.

PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE EXISTING SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY

As discussed above, the weight of authority holds that the filing of
a partial motion to dismiss suspends the defendant's time for answering the
entire complaint,1 60 and not merely the claims that are the subject of its motion.161 However, Rule 12 itself is unclear on the issue, 162 the case law ad158 Stoutt v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 598 F. Supp. 1000, 1001 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (emphasis
added); see also Renshaw v. Renshaw, 153 F.2d 310, 310 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1946). The Renshaw
court stated:
The [defendant's] motion was entitled "Defendant's Motions to Strike; Motions to
Dismiss; and for better Bill of Particulars." In the text, the motions were "to strike" in
part and "to dismiss" in part. The judgment of the court was to grant the "motion to
dismiss" the complaint. We think the difference in words was immaterial.
Renshaw, 153 F.2d at 310 n.1.
159 See, e.g., Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 5A 05 CA 0319 OG (NN), 2006 WL
581215, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2006). "Defendant timely filed a motion to strike certain portions of plaintiff's complaint.. .Pursuant to [Rule] 12(a)(4)(A), defendant's responsive pleading to
plaintiffs complaint was to be served on plaintiff within 10 days after receiving notice of the Order and Opinion denying the motion to strike." Id. at * 1. "[A] party is in default if it has been
served with a summons and has "failed to plead or otherwise defend." A defendant "pleads" by
filing an answer.. Under FRCP 12(a), a party will "otherwise defend" if it files a motion to dismiss.. .or a motion to strike." Morrow County Sch. Dist. #1 v. Oregon Land & Water Co., 716
P.2d 766, 769 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
160 See Clark v. Commercial State Bank, No. MO-00-CA-140, 2001 WL 685529, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2001) (observing that "the weight of authority holds that filing even a partial
12(b) motion suspends the time to respond to the entire complaint") (citing 5A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1346 (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 2000)).
161 See Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 639 (N.D.
Iowa 2006); Pestube Sys., Inc. v. HomeTeam Pest Def., LLC, 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,304, at 105,156-57 (D. Ariz. 2006); Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D.
571, 572 (E.D. Va. 2002); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249
(W.D.N.Y. 1998); Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D. 219, 220 (N.D. 111.1997).
162 See Cagan, supra note 13, at 202. "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) does not expressly address whether a 'partial' motion to dismiss (i.e., one which seeks dismissal of less than
all counts of the complaint) automatically extends a defendant's time to answer the unchallenged
causes of action of the complaint." Id.; cf Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., No. 93
C 6866, 1994 WL 9638, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1994). Furthermore,
[th]e difficulty is that, if the [partial] motion is granted, it will still be necessary for the
defendant to serve an answer to the remaining claims of the complaint, and Rule
12(a)'s provisions regarding the alteration of the period of time within which to answer
makes no specific provision for a situation in which a Rule 12 motion (other than one
for a more definite statement) is granted but an answer is nonetheless required.
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dressing it is not extensive,163 and
the question thus technically remains an
64
open one in most jurisdictions. 1
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the issue, even a court embracing the minority view is unlikely to conclude that entering a default judgment against a defendant who has filed a partial motion to dismiss is the
appropriate remedy for its failure to respond to the claims not addressed in
its motion. 165 Indeed, the Gerlach court itself concluded that default is too
harsh a penalty for a defendant's failure to submit an answer, 166 and gave
defenthe defendant in that case ten days from the date of its ruling on the
1 67
dant's partial motion to dismiss within which to submit an answer.
However, the courts' strong aversion to default judgments' 68 obviously does not prevent an aggressive plaintiff from seeking one. 169 RegardRawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *1.
163 See Finnegan, 180 F.R.D. at 249; Oil Express Nat ', 173 F.R.D. at 220.
164 See generally Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, 572 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (noting that "[c]ase law.. fails to conclusively decide the issue"); Belinfante, supra
note 17, at 21 (pointing out that "the law remains largely unsettled, and controlling authority is
present in only a few jurisdictions").
165 See, e.g., Avnet, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 115 F.R.D. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(declining to enter a default judgment on the ground that the "defendants' failure to plead as to
[the counts that were not addressed in their motion to dismiss] was inadvertent"). One court
stated:
Significant case law and one of the most authoritative treatises on Federal Practice and
Procedure supports Defendants' position that, when a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, addressing only some of the claims contained in the plaintiffs complaint, the defendant is not required to file an answer until the court rules on the motion
to dismiss.. .Given this, the court has no trouble concluding that, even if Defendants'
view of the Federal Rules is mistaken, Defendants had good cause...for their alleged
default. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and grants Defendants' Motion to Vacate Entry of Default.
Schwartz v. Berry Coll., Inc., 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 999, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
166 See Gerlach v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See generally Sony Corp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that it is appropriate for a court to consider "whether the entry of default would lead to a harsh result"); Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 313 v. Skaggs, 130 F.R.D. 526, 530 (D. Del. 1990) (stating "[tlo avoid the harshness of a default, courts favor alternative sanctions which would be
equally effective yet less severe.").
167 See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174; see also Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments,
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598, 638 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (noting that the Gerlach court "determined that
the appropriate remedy was not the entry of default judgment.. .but an order directing the defendant to file an answer").
168 See Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 160 F.R.D. 151, 152 (D. Kan.
1995) (discussing "the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures favoring
decisions on the merits and against default judgments").
169 See, e.g., Richter v. Corporate Fin. Assocs., No. l:06-cv-1623-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL
1164649, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2007) (discussing plaintiff's contention "that the Defendants
are in default with respect to the First Claim and Second Claim because their motion to dismiss
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less of how remote the actual risk of default may be in such a case, 70 few
defendants will want to run that risk, or incur "the expense of defending
such a challenge.' 7' Nor should any prudent lawyer welcome the opportunity to explain to the court17 2-or to a client, for that matter173-why the

client is not actually in default. 74 Thus, a defendant or lawyer contemplating the submission of a partial motion to dismiss also should consider pursuing one of several potential means of avoiding a finding of default on the
claims not addressed in the motion. 175
A.

Alternative One: Movingfor PartialJudgment on the Pleadings

A defendant seeking the dismissal of only some of the plaintiffs
addresses only the Third Claim and they did not file an Answer as to the former claims"); Alex.
Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Marine Midland Banks, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 2549 RWS, 1997 WL 97837, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that "Alex. Brown has moved for a default judgment with respect
to the claims Marine has not moved to dismiss, based on Marine's refusal to answer those claims
prior to a decision on the instant motion to dismiss"); Avnet, 115 F.R.D. at 592 (noting that the
plaintiff "move[d] that a default judgment should be entered" against the defendants on the counts
of the complaint they "neither moved [to dismiss] nor answered").
170See generally Cagan, supra note 13, at 204. "Although a court is likely to vacate a clerk's
entry of default or a default judgment even if it agrees with the Gerlach interpretation of
Rule 12(a), it is possible that a court may refuse to vacate them." Id.
171Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977).
172 As one commentator noted,
[I]t is the clerk, and not the court, which enters a default as a matter of course if less
than all of the counts are attacked. Hence, even if the court agrees that Rule 12(a)
enlarges a defendant's time to answer all of the counts until resolution of the motion,
the attorney will be forced to file a motion to vacate the clerk's entry of default.
Cagan, supra note 13, at 204 (footnote omitted).
173See generally Murray v. Solidarity of Labor Org. Int'l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp.
2d 1134, 1144, reconsiderationdenied, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Iowa 2001). "[lIn response
to a motion for entry of default or default judgment, a reasonably competent attorney could be
expected, for example, to.. explain to the client the procedural footing of the case, the merits of
the opposing party's motion for entry of a default or default judgment, and the specific steps the
attorney intended to take to rectify any dilatory response to the lawsuit." Id.
174See, e.g., Schwartz v. Berry Coll., Inc. 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 999, 1000 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (granting the defendants' motion to vacate a default entered by the clerk when the defendants' motion to dismiss "addresse[d] only one of Plaintiffs claims"); Brocksopp Eng'g, Inc.
v. Bach-Simpson Ltd., 136 F.R.D. 485, 486 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (discussing the defendant's motion
"to vacate the clerk's.. entry of default" on the ground that "the service of a 12(b) motion,
whether or not it goes to all the claims in a complaint, enlarges the time for answering the remaining portions of the complaint").
175There are various ways in which a default can be avoided. See generall' Verkuilen v. S.
Shore Bldg. & Mortgage Co., 122 F.3d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1997). "[A defendant] that receives a
complaint in a civil case must file an answer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(l)(A) within 20 days of
service of the summons and complaint, or file another appropriate document such as a motion to
dismiss, or a motion for extension of time." Id.
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claims can avoid defaulting on the other claims by filing a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), 176 rather than a partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b).177 As one court explained:
The difference between the two types of motions stems
from when in the course of proceedings they can be raised.
Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6), indeed, under 12(b)
generally, must be brought by a defendant "before pleading" (i.e., before filing its answer to the complaint). Motions brought under Rule 12(c) cannot be filed until "[a]fter
17
the pleadings are closed" (i.e., after filing its answer). 1
Because a defendant cannot file a Rule 12(c) motion until after it
files an answer, 179 this approach would eliminate the risk of defaulting on

claims not addressed in its motion 18 (assuming the answer itself was
timely filed).'

In addition, a defendant filing an answer and a Rule 12(c)

176 See generally Does I Through III v. District of Columbia, 238 F. Supp. 2d 212, 221 n.9
(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that "it is well established that 'a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is appropriate') (quoting VNA Plus, Inc. v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1258 (D. Kan. 1998)); Moran v. Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 825 F. Supp. 891, 893 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (commenting that while the language of Rule 12(c) does not authorize "'partial' judgments,
neither does it bar them, and it is common practice to apply Rule 12(c) to individual causes of
action"); Cagan, supra note 13, at 205 n. 1 (observing that "partial motions are sometimes brought
pursuant to.. Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings)").
177 See, e.g., Kohn v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 966 F. Supp. 789, 790 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(discussing defendant's partial motion to dismiss); see also Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (noting
that a defendant seeking the dismissal of only part of the plaintiffs complaint "could file an answer, then file a motion for [partial] judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)"). But see
Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Mayo Found., 6 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (stating "it is not
clear whether a Rule 12(c) motion should be granted when it would not dispose of the entire
case").

178 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) & (c)); see also Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San
Diego, 311 F. Supp. 2d 898, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (observing that "a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is usually brought after an answer has been filed, whereas a motion to dismiss is typically brought before an answer is filed").
179 See Straker v. Metro. Transit Auth., 333 F. Supp. 2d 91, 94 n.I (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Geltman
v. Verity, 716 F. Supp. 491, 492 (D. Colo. 1989); N.Y. State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459
F. Supp. 677, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
180 See Jack v. Baker, No. l:01CV04, 2001 WL 34070117, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2001).
"[P]rior to the filing of the [Plaintiffs] Motion for Default Judgment, the Defendants filed an Answer and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.. Accordingly, the relief sought is not appropriate... since Defendants have timely acted to defend this action." Id.; cf Gordon-Maizel Constr.
Co. v. LeRoy Prods., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that the defendants "answered the complaint, rather than risk a default judgment").
181 See, e.g., Bilzerian v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 1509, 1512 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (noting
that the defendant "answered Plaintiffs'
Complaint in a timely manner," and
"[s]ubsequently.. filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings solely with respect to the claims
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motion instead of a pre-answer motion to dismiss ordinarily would not be
waiving any of its substantive arguments for dismissal. 8 2 On the other
hand, precisely because a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
cannot be made until after the pleadings are closed, 8 3 a defendant proceed-

ing in this manner necessarily foregoes the essential benefit of the automatic enlargement of time provided for in Rule 12(a)184 -- delaying, and in
some cases6 even avoiding,' 8 5 the need to prepare and file a responsive
18
pleading.
B.

Alternative Two: Filinga PartialAnswer

A defendant seeking to avoid default also could file a partial motion to dismiss and simultaneously (or at least prior to the expiration of the
original twenty day period for responding to the complaint)18 7 file a "par-

of [one] Plaintiff'), rev 'd on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1067 (11 th Cit. 1996); Jamaica Lodge 2188
of Bhd. of Ry. Employees v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 253, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)
(stating "after filing a timely answer, the defendant in this action moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(c)... for judgment on the pleadings").
182 See Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "[a]
defendant may use a rule 12(c) motion after the close of the pleadings to raise various rule 12(b)
defenses regarding procedural defects, in which case courts apply the same standard applicable to
the corresponding 12(b) motion").
Rule 12(c) can be invoked in a number of situations where a Rule 12(b) motion could
have been, but was not, filed by the defendant. Thus, often times, after a responsive
pleading has been filed, a defendant will move to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(c), even though there may be no need to refer to the responsive pleading, such that it would have been proper to move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Reed Elsevier, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 947-48 (citations omitted).
183 See Signature Combs, Inc. v. U.S., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); Little
v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. 652, 653 (D. Md. 1992), aff'd, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993).
184 See Blessing v. Norman, 646 F. Supp. 82, 83 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (noting that "pre-answer
motions.. .toll [the] defendant's time for answering" under Rule 12(a)) (emphasis added); 6 B.E.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Proceedings Without Trial § 164, at 577 (4th ed. 1997) (stating "[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings does not extend the time to plead so as to avoid a
default, and thus should not be filed in lieu of a responsive pleading") (citation omitted).
185 In some cases in which a defendant's partial motion to dismiss is granted, the plaintiff
may decide not to pursue its remaining claims. See, e.g., Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22
(11 th Cir. 1995) (explaining the district court's actions in the case, dismissing "two counts of the
plaintiffs' complaint on defendant's motion. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their remaining
claims using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2)").
186 See Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (observing that Rule 12(a) "temporarily relieves defendant of the duty to answer"); Carter v. Am. Bus
Lines, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 323, 326 (D. Neb. 1958) (explaining the rationale of raising defenses by
motion under 12(b) "rather than answer [as] the hope to have the defense sustained without resorting to the trouble of pleading an answer").
187 Rule 12(b) requires the defendant to file its motion to dismiss "before pleading if a further
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tial" answer addressing the claims it is not moving to dismiss.
proach has been explained in the following manner:

8

This ap-

One option for a defendant filing a partial motion to dismiss is to file, simultaneously, a partial answer to the complaint - answering only those claims not addressed in the
partial motion to dismiss. Then, following notice of the
court's action on the motion to dismiss, the defendant has
10 days to answer the remaining counts of the complaint,
to the extent necessary under the court's ruling.1 89
While this tactic has been employed in a number of cases, 90 it offers no apparent advantage over (and in many cases may be the practical
equivalent of)t 9t filing an answer and a Rule 12(c) motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. 92 Indeed, a partial motion to dismiss submitted

pleading is permitted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1093
n.35 (11 th Cir. 2001). However, the rule does not prohibit the defendant from submitting an answer after filing its motion. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bank of Bentonville, 29 F. Supp. 2d
553, 555 (W.D. Ark. 1998); cf Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615, 618 (S.D. W. Va. 1970) (stating "[e]ach of the defendants... have filed motions to dismiss this action, and by leave of the
Court [two of] the defendants.. .were also permitted to file their answer to the complaint prior to
the Court's disposition of the dismissal motions."), qftd,436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1971).
188 See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (discussing "situations where a defendant files his Rule 12(b) motion simultaneously with his answer"). See generally Stein v. Kent State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 994 F. Supp. 898, 902 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (explaining the norm of filing a 12(b) motion before or simultaneously with the responsive pleading), aff'd, 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999).
189 Apjohn & Brady, supra note 18, at § 6.2.1(b); (f Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F.
Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (asserting that "the better practice is timely to file an answer,
even where a motion to dismiss has been filed").
190 See, e.g., Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 1978); Chisholm v. T.J.X. Cos., 286 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (E.D. Va. 2003); Imboden v. Chowns Commc'ns,
182 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 181 F. Supp.
2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Gravely v. Madden, 964 F. Supp. 260, 261 (S.D. Ohio 1995);
Admiral Theatre v. City of Chicago, 832 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (N.D. 111.1993); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Buehler Ltd. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 722
F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. I1. 1989); Horwitz v. Alloy Auto. Co., 677 F. Supp. 564, 565-66
1988).
(N.D. Ill.
191 See, e.g., Stanley v. St. Croix Basic Serv., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 379, 381 n.1 (D.VI.
2003) (explaining that "because the Partial Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer was filed at
the same time as the Answer, it should have been framed as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)"); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d
942, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (stating "where the pleadings are closed but a defendant mistakenly
moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), instead of Rule 12(c).. it is proper to treat a motion styled
as one under Rule 12(b)(6) as if it were brought under Rule 12(c)").
192 See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Thompson, 943 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (W.D. Wis.
1996), aff'd, 161 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 1998). "Plaintiff contends that defendants' motion should be
considered as a request for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) rather than
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pursuant to Rule 12(b) might be "rendered moot by the filing of an answer,"1 93 making it "procedurally impossible" for the court to rule on the

motion 194 (or at least to grant the motion)

95

without first recasting it as a

196

motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.
Alternatively, in two cases in which this approach was followed,
Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Co. 19 7 and Perkins v. Univer-

sity of Illinois at Chicago,198 the courts struck partial answers the defendants submitted concurrently with their partial motions to dismiss 199 in order to permit consideration of the motions. 200 The Rawson court
as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion because it was filed after defendants had answered the complaint, but plaintiff has not shown any reasonfor preferringone rule over the other." Id. (emphasis added).
193 Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 709 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1989); see also
Mendez v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F. Supp. 481, 482 n.l (S.D. Fla. 1990) (explaining
"[d]efendant's motion to dismiss was mooted when Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint").
194 Brisk, 709 F. Supp. at 1147; cf Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 971 n.6
(I Ith Cir. 2002). "After answering the complaint, the defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. Under Rule 12(b), these motions were a nullity; by filing an answer, the defendants.. eschewed the option of asserting by motion that the complaint failed to
state a claim for relief" Leonard, 279 F.3d at 971, n.6.
195 See Walburn v. City of Naples, No. 2:04-CV-194-FTM33DNF, 2005 WL 2322002, at
*10 n. 16 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2005) (stating that because defendant moved to dismiss a count but
then answered, the motion to dismiss was denied) (citation omitted); Vassardakis v. Parish, 36 F.
Supp. 1002, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The Vassardakis court stated:
Defendants have moved for dismissal of the "Second", "Third" and "Fourth" Counts of
the plaintiffs amended complaint as failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.. Defendants' motion to dismiss is made under Rule 12(b)(6)... which requires
that such a motion shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.
The defendants have filed answers to this amended complaint so this motion to dismiss
must be denied.
Vassardakis, 36 F. Supp. at 1003.
196 See Brisk, 709 F. Supp. at 1147-48; see, e.g., Mueller Co. v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.,
No. Civ. 03-170-JD, 2003 WL 22272135, at *1 (D.N.H. Oct. 2, 2003) (stating that "[d]uring the
pendency of its partial motion to dismiss, [defendant] filed an answer" and therefore "the court
must treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings"); Koski v. Gainer, 63
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 939, 940 (N.D. I11.
1993) (explaining that defendants' motion to
dismiss filed in conjunction with their answer results in motion being treated as Rule 12(c) motion); cf Colin v. Marconi Commerce Sys. Employees' Ret. Plan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 n.20
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (same).
197 No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638 (N.D. 111.Jan. 11, 1994).
198 13 A.D.D. 986 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
199 See Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *2; Perkins, 13 A.D.D. at 989, 993.
200 Cf Russell v. NMB Techs., Inc., No. 92 C 6530, 1993 WL 278496, at *1 (N.D. I11.
July
22, 1993) (explaining that the matter "is before the Court on defendant['s].. motion to withdraw
his answer in order to move for dismissal pursuant to [FRCP] 12(b)"); United States v. Kiros, 149
F. Supp. 730, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1956) (describing a defendant who sought "leave to withdraw [his]
answer and to file a motion to dismiss").
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acknowledged that the language of Rule 12 is unclear with respect to
whether a motion to dismiss "that goes to some, but not all, of the claims in
the complaint" automatically enlarges the time within which the defendant
must answer. 2 1 The defendant's "solution" to this uncertainty was to file a
motion to dismiss two counts of the complaint, and an answer to the re202
maining counts. 2°
The court concluded that the defendant's submission of a partial
answer, while well-intentioned,2 3 was contrary to the applicable procedural
rules. 2 4 Specifically, Rule 7(a) 20 5 appears to contemplate only a single answer to a complaint regardless of the number of claims alleged,2 °6 and not
the type of "partial" answer the defendant submitted.20 7 The court therefore

held that a defendant filing a partial motion to dismiss is only required to
submit a single, comprehensive answer within the extended time provided

21 Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *1. The rule does not specifically require that a motion to
dismiss "go to all of the claims in the complaint" in order to enlarge the defendant's time for answering. Id. On the other hand, the rule makes no provision for enlarging the time for answering
when a motion to dismiss "is granted but an answer is nonetheless required" - as may be the case
when a partial motion to dismiss is filed. Id. (emphasis added).
202 Id. at *2.
203 See id. In characterizing the defendant's conduct as "well-intentioned," id., the Rawson
court presumably was alluding to the fact that "the filing of an answer may be.. .a careful lawyer's decision to avoid the risk of default." Prod. Stamping Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 829 F.
Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1993); ef Landman v. Borough of Bristol, 896 F. Supp. 406, 409
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that "[w]hen filing an answer, a party may simply be seeking to avoid the
risks of default").
204 See Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *2; cf Becker v. Fitzgerald, No. 94 C 7646, 1995 WL
215143, at *2 (N.D. I11.Apr. 10, 1995) (commenting that "[t]he procedure defendant...used -interposing an answer to part of a complaint and making a Rule 12 motion directed to another
part of the complaint -- is nowhere to be found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
205 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
206 See Perkins v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 13 A.D.D. 986, 987 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that "[t]he
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate the filing of a single answer, not separate answers
to separate counts of the complaint") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 7); Becker, 1995 WL 215143, at *2
(same).
207 Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *2. The court's interpretation of the rule presumably was
premised on the fact that it authorizes a defendant to file "an answer" and "[n]o other pleading" in
response to a plaintiffs complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a). But cf Scherer v. Mission Bank, No.
01-2727-KHV, 2001 WL 789283, at *1 (D. Kan. 2001), aff'd, 34 Fed. Appx. 656 (10th Cir.
2002). The Scherer court stated:
Plaintiff argues that defendant cannot file both an answer and a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff bases his argument on Rule 7(a)...which provides in part that there shall be a
complaint and an answer but "[n]o other pleading." A motion to dismiss is not considered a "pleading" for purposes of Rule 7(a). The Court therefore rejects defendant's
argument.
Scherer, 2001 WL 789283, at *1.
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for under Rule 12(a)(I ),208 regardless of whether its motion is granted or
denied.20 9
The defendant in Perkins similarly answered one count of the
plaintiffs complaint while simultaneously moving to dismiss the complaint's remaining counts. 210 The court held that this procedure violated the
requirement under Rule 7(a) 21 1 that a defendant file "a single answer to a
complaint,, 212 as well as Rule 12(b)'s requirement (or alleged requirement)2 13 that a motion to dismiss "be made before (not after or even at the
same time as) pleading., 21 4 After rejecting various other alternatives, 2 15 the
court struck the defendant's partial answer (presumably with implicit leave
to file a comprehensive answer later),21 6 and treated its partial motion to
208 See Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *2; (f Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No.
CIV-85-1404E, 1987 WL 18693, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1987) (stating "[t]he defendants'
motion to dismiss the fourth through fourteenth claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. rule 12(b)(6)
clearly tolls the time in which the plaintiff may answer") (emphasis added).
209 See Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *2 (explaining that "[t]he court will...fix the time for the
serving of a single, complete answer as the time fixed under Rule 12(a)(l), regardless of whether
the motion to dismiss is granted or denied"); cf. Becker, 1995 WL 215143, at *2 (stating "[i]f a
motion for a more definite statement has been served and made [under Rule 12], the defendant's
single answer is to be made after the ruling on the motion within the time limits set by Rule
12(a)(4)(A)").
210 See Perkins v. Univ. of lll.
at Chi., 13 A.D.D. 986, 987 (N.D. I11.
1995).
211 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).

212 Perkins, 13 ADD. at 988; see also A. F. Wagner Iron Works v. United States, 89 F.
Supp. 1016, 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (pointing out that "Rule 7(a)...allows motions [under Rule 12] if
made before the single, responsivepleading otherwise required") (emphasis added).
213 See Beary v. West Publ'g Co., 763 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating "[ajlthough
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) encourages the responsive pleader to file a motion to dismiss before pleading,
nothing in the rule prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss with an answer"); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield v. Nat'l Student Servs., Inc., No. CIV. A. No. 89-1707, 1990 WL 74347, at *1 n.2
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 1990) (reading FRCP as not "absolutely requir[ing] that a motion to dismiss.. precede the filing of a responsive pleading").
214 Perkins, 13 A.D.D. at 988; see also Beebe v. Williams Coll., 430 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.
Mass. 2006) (observing that it is "technically improper for [a defendant] to answer the complaint
and simultaneously move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)"); Progressive N. Ins. Co. v.
Alivio Chiropractic Clinic, No. 05-0951 PAM/RLE, 2005 WL 3526581, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 22,
2005) (announcing that "a party should not file a responsive pleading in conjunction with a motion to dismiss"); cf Mini Billboard Corp. v. Personal Billboard Co., Civ.A.No. 85-7133, 1986
WL 3755, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 1986). "The Federal Rules do not contemplate partial responsive pleadings, accompanied by motions under Rule 12(e). Indeed, F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) expressly
states that motions for more definite statements may be filed only 'before' a responsive pleading
is filed." Mini BillboardCorp., 1986 WL 3755, at *1.
215 Among other things, the court indicated it could strike both the answer and the partial motion to dismiss and permit the defendant to decide which of the two documents to resubmit. See
Perkins, 13 A.D.D. at 988-89. Although this would have allowed the defendant to "take the action it intended," the court concluded that it "would be wasteful of the time of both the court and
counsel" because the defendant clearly intended to seek partial dismissal of the complaint. Id.at
989.
216 Cf Banske v. Tarka, No. 02 C 7359, 2003 WL 23149, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2003) (stat-
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dismiss as having been properly filed.217
C.

Alternative Three. Moving to Dismiss the "Entire" Complaint

Another alternative arguably available to a defendant seeking the
dismissal of only some of the plaintiff's claims is simply to refrain from
characterizing its Rule 12(b) motion as one for "partial" dismissal.21 8
However, this tactic is neither an appropriate nor a particularly effective
means of avoiding the need to answer any counts of the complaint that are
not addressed in the motion. 2 19 Not only is a court likely to ignore the defendant's mislabeling of its motion, 220 but the mislabeling may even result
ing "[tlo
enable the reader to look at a single responsive pleading rather than a patchwork combination, the entire Answer is stricken. Leave is of course granted to file a self-contained Amended
Answer"). See generally Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (explaining that "if a.. motion to strike is granted, it is generally granted with leave to
amend").
217 See Perkins, 13 A.D.D. at 989; cf Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp.
1286, 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1984). "[T]he preferred rule to apply in situations where a defendant files
his Rule 12(b) motion simultaneously with his answer is that the motion should be 'viewed as
having preceded the answer and thus as having been interposed in a timely fashion."' Kuhlmeier,
578 F. Supp. at 1290 (bracketing omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1361, at 634 (1969)).

218 See, e.g., Scibetta v. Rehtmeyer, Inc., No. 05 C 5246, 2005 WL 331559, at *2 n.3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 9, 2005) (stating that defendant's motion, styled as a motion to dismiss, is really a partial
motion to dismiss); Swartz v. Comm'r, No. 05-72215, 2005 WL 3278026, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
26, 2005) (same); Capresecco v. Jenkintown Borough, 261 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(commenting that defendants' motion to dismiss is "in the nature of a Partial Motion to Dismiss"); Swiss Bank Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 942 F. Supp. 398, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing a defendant's "request to dismiss the complaint in its entirety," even though its motion to dismiss "failed to address Count II of the complaint"), reconsiderationdenied, 944 F. Supp. 671
(N.D. 111.1996).
219 Cf Ricke v. Armco, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 149, 150 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding that the defendant's filing of what was essentially a motion for summary judgment, which the defendant instead labeled a "Motion to Dismiss" in order to avoid filing an answer, did not toll the time for
answering under Rule 12(a)(4) because a "litigant should not be permitted to gain an advantage
by intentionally mislabeling a filing"). But cf Marquez v. Cable One, Inc., 463 F.3d 1118, 1120
( 10th Cir. 2006). The Marquez court stated:
Plaintiff [argues] that a motion for summary judgment does not toll the time for filing
an answer. [The defendant] filed its motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, however, which clearly does toll the time to answer. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4) and 12(b).
Thus, the motion did toll the time to file an answer until the district court converted it
to a motion for summary judgment and resolved the motion.
Marquez, 463 F.3d at 1120.
220 See, e.g., Musgrove v. Peters, No. 92 C 3267, 1993 WL 105391, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr.
6, 1993) (explaining that while "[d]efendants' motion is styled as a general motion to dismiss.. .as
it only addresses Count I of the complaint, it is deemed a motion for partial dismissal"); cf Wade
v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (D. Haw. 1990) (describing a defendant's "motion to

80

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIII

in the court's rejection of a meritorious argument for dismissing some of
"
the plaintiffs claims.22
'
In Eye Encounter, Inc. v. Contour Art, Ltd.,222 for example, the
court denied a defendant's motion to dismiss the entire complaint even
though some of the counts otherwise might have been subject to dismissal:

Here, defendant's motion is aimed at the dismissal of the
[a]ction and not to separate counts of the complaint. In
this situation, if one of the counts is sufficient, the motion
should be denied in its entirety unless the court chooses to
consider the motion as addressed to each count separately.
This the court chooses not to do.223

D.

Alternative Four: Requesting an Enlargement of Time to Answer

Finally, a defendant filing a partial motion to dismiss could simply
request an enlargement of time to respond to the remainder of the complaint under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 224 Upon

dismiss" that "should [have been].. .characterized as a motion for partial dismissal").
221 See, e.g., Day v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1508, 1514 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (noting that a motion to dismiss requesting that "the complaint as a whole, rather than... individual
counts, be stricken" may be "denied in its entirety if one cause of action is sufficient") (citing
Bleecker v. Drury, 3 F.R.D. 325 (W.D.N.Y. 1944)); cf United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108
F. Supp. 348, 349 (D.D.C. 1952) (explaining that "[a]lthough the counterclaim alleges two separate counts for damages, the motion to dismiss is directed against the entire counterclaim. In
view of the Court's conclusion that count one should not be dismissed, it is unnecessary for the
purposes of this motion to consider count two").
222 81 F.R.D. 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
223 Id. at 689 (citation omitted). But cf Furniture Consultants, Inc. v. Datatel Minicomputer
Co., No. 85 Civ. 8518 (RLC), 1986 WL 7792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1986).
[The defendant's] motion is aimed at the dismissal of the action and not to the separate
counts of the complaint. Hence, if one of the counts is sufficient, the motion should be
denied in its entirety unless the court chooses to consider the motion as addressed to
each count separately.. .As certain of defendant's 13 claims may be barred.. making
discovery on these counts unnecessary, the court will consider the motion to dismiss as
addressed to each count separately, and dismiss only that part of the complaint which
fails to state a cause of action.
FurnitureConsultants, Inc., 1986 WL 7792, at *3.
224 FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b). One commentator suggested that a defendant need only "seek permission from opposing counsel to extend its time to answer the unchallenged counts." Cagan,
supra note 13, at 204; see, e.g., Ortiz v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F. Supp. 526, 531
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (noting "plaintiffs attorney agreed to allow defendants additional time to answer
or otherwise plead"). However, "approval of the court is necessary to make effective a stipulation
extending the time in which to answer or otherwise move in response to the complaint." Gray v.
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timely request and a showing of cause,225 Rule 6(b) authorizes a court to
extend the time within which a party must serve a responsive pleading2 26
or, with certain limited exceptions, 227 take any other action required or
permitted under the federal rules.228 Thus, a defendant seeking an enlarge-

ment of time to respond to any claims not addressed in its partial motion to
dismiss should request the enlargement when it submits its partial mo-

tion, 229 and in any event prior to the expiration of the original1 (or any pre23
230
viously extended) period for responding to the complaint.

Lewis & Clark Expeditions, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995 (D. Neb. 1998); see also INVST Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 400 (6th Cir. 1987) (commenting that
"lawyers... thwart the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by seeking and granting extensions without court approval").
225 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 6(b)(1). If the request for enlargement of time is made before the
original time expires, the party making it "is not required to.. file a motion in support thereof."
Kernisant v. City of N.Y., 225 F.R.D. 422, 431 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Choi v. Chem.
Bank, 939 F. Supp. 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating "Rule 6(b)(l) does not require that a request be made by motion"). On the other hand, "a defendant who has missed a filing deadline
must move to enlarge the time for filing and must demonstrate that the failure to file was the result of 'excusable neglect."' Connell v. City of N.Y., 230 F. Supp. 2d 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b)(2)).
226 See Sony Corp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1986); Caudell v.
Rose, 378 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728-29 (W.D. Va. 2005); Connell, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 437; Poe v.
Cristina Copper Mines, 15 F.R.D. 85, 88 (D. Del. 1953); Blanton v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co., 4 F.R.D.
200, 204 (W.D.N.C.), appeal dismissed, 146 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1944).
227 See Mints v. Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that
"Rule 6(b)(2) does list certain rules with time constraints that the court ordinarily cannot extend"); Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 287 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing Rule 6(b)'s time
limits).
228 See Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1994); Brady v. Marks,
7 F. Supp. 2d 247, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating "Rule 6(b) permits a court ... to extend any time
period prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure upon a timely request by the party subject to
the time period in question").
229 See, e.g., MacNeil v. Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Del. 1958) (noting that the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by only one of the plaintiffs and,
on the same day, filed a "second motion [that] sought an extension of time to move, answer or
otherwise defend the action until 20 days after disposition of the first motion"); see also Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (explaining that "[many practitioners wisely file a motion to extend
the time to answer pending the court's resolution of the [partial] motion to dismiss. Such a motion tells the court why no answer will be forthcoming, and it provides strong ammunition if the
opposing party moves for a default judgment").
230 See Choi, 939 F. Supp. at 309. "A district court has wide discretion to grant an enlargement of time.. if the request is made within the expiration period or as extended by previous order." Id. In the absence of an express limitation to the contrary, an enlargement of time for submitting a responsive pleading "carrie[s] with it an enlargement of time for filing any preliminary
motion" including, presumably, a motion for a further enlargement of time to submit the responsive pleading. Blanton v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co., 4 F.R.D. 200, 205 (W.D.N.C. 1944), appeal dismissed, 146 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1944); see also Bechtel v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 534 F.2d 1335,
1341 (9th Cir. 1976) (reasoning that "[I]f an extension of time has been allowed for filing a responsive pleading, logic and reason.. .dictate that the extension should apply to a motion as
well").
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This eminently practical approach,2 32 which has been followed in a
number of cases,233 minimizes any risk the defendant will be found to be in
default.2 34 It also may avoid difficult questions about the need to assert
compulsory counterclaims that might arise if the defendant instead filed a
partial answer with its partial motion to dismiss, 235 or elected to file a partial or comprehensive answer with 236-- or prior to filing 237-a motion for

231 See Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122 (D. Mass. 2001).
"Rule 12(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P., allows a party 20 days after being served with the summons and
complaint to file an answer. Rule 6(b)( 1),
Fed.R.Civ.P., permits a party to file a motion to extend
the time period for filing an answer within the time frame of the 20-day period." Id.; Canup v.
Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (explaining that "[tihe proper
procedure, when additional time for any purpose is needed, is to present to the Court a timely request for extension of time (i.e., a request presented before the time then fixed for the purpose in
question has expired")).
232 See United States v. One Ford Coupe, 26 F. Supp. 598, 598 (M.D. Pa. 1939) (observing
that where there is "any reasonable excuse for [a] delinquency... Rule 6(b) provides a simple
method whereby the time might [be] extended"); cf Brady, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (invoking Rule
6(b) sua sponte "to avoid unnecessarily burdening defendants with having to respond to what appeared ...
to be a meritless complaint").
233 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 811 (2d Cir. 1940); Daneshvar v.
Graphic Tech., Inc., No. 04-2212-JWL, 2005 WL 348312, at *2 n.2 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2005);
Shkrobut v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 8051, 2005 WL 2787277, at **2, 4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24,
2005); Fairley v. Andrews, 300 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669-70 (N.D. 111.2004); In re Cendant Corp.
Sec. Litig., 190 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.N.J. 1999); Gines v. Bailey, Civ. A. No. 92-4170, 1992 WL
394512, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1992); Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622, 625
(D.D.C. 1991); Carver v. Cont'l Grain Co., 662 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (D. Minn. 1987); Graney v.
City of Chicago, No. 97 C 694, 1987 WL 18579, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 13, 1987); Gates Energy Prods., Inc. v. Yuasa Battery Co., 599 F. Supp. 368, 370 (D. Colo. 1983).
234 See, e.g., MacNeil, 160 F. Supp. at 158-59 (denying the plaintiffs motion for default
judgment because the court had "granted a motion to extend the time for answer until 20 days
after the determination of the [defendant's] motion to dismiss"); R.E.F. Golf Co. v. Roberts Metals Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1070, 1072 (M.D. Fla. 1992) ("Since an Order Extending the Time
to Answer...has been entered in this proceeding, Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default and for
Entry of Judgment on Default does not meet the criterion necessary under the provisions [of]
Rule 55."); cf United States v. Gant, 268 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining "to avoid
entry of default, the defendant should seek an extension of time to respond").
235 See, e.g., Zeballos v. Tan, No. 06 Civ. 1268 (GEL), 2006 WL 1975995, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2006) (noting that the defendant "submitted a Partial Answer with Counterclaims" while
her motion to dismiss was pending); Rosania v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 878, 880
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (describing a defendant who "filed a partial motion to dismiss" and "also filed
its Answer... and asserted two counterclaims").
236 See, e.g., Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining defendant's
actions in answering the complaint "and simultaneously fil[ing] a motion for judgment on the
pleadings"); McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 927 F.2d 1125, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Smith
v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 833 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (stating '[t]he matter currently before the
court is [defendant's] motion for judgment on the pleadings... filed along with his answer").
237 See, e.g., Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006) (pointing out that defendant "filed an answer and then moved for judgment on the pleadings"); Inst. for Scientific
Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating
that defendants filed their 12(c) motion after filing their answer); E. A. Weinel Constr. Co. v.
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partial judgment on the pleadings.238
The compulsory counterclaim issue stems from the fact that Rule
13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 239 "requires a defendant serving an answer to plead any counterclaims 'arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject of the opposing party's claim.' 240 Because
the rule does not require (or apparently even permit) 241 the defendant to assert such a counterclaim unless it serves-or is obligated to serve 242-a
Mueller Co.. 289 F. Supp. 293, 296 (E.D. Il1. 1968) (same).
238 Compare Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 14 F.3d 1122,
1125 (6th Cir. 1994) (describing a defendant that "filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings") and Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1376 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (observing that the defendant "could have filed an answer, counterclaim,
and motion for judgment on the pleadings"), vacated and remanded, 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002) with McMahan v. Cornelius, 756 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D. Ind. 1991). The McMahan
court articulated that:
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not to be filed until "[a]fter the pleadings
are closed." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).. .Because the defendants filed a counterclaim denominated as such, the plaintiffs were required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a)
to file a reply. By filing their motion together with their answer and counterclaim, the
defendants were filing prematurely.
McMahan, 756 F. Supp. at 1159.
239 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). For a prior academic discussion of Rule 13(a) - commonly known
as the compulsory counterclaim rule - see Michael D. Conway, Comment, Narrowing the Scope
ofRule 13(a), 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 141 (1993).
240 Lobo Recording Corp. v. Waterland, 197 F.R.D. 23, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (bracketing
omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)); see also Lindquist v. Quinones, 79 F.R.D. 158, 161
(D.V.I. 1978) (stating "Rule 13(a) requires a party to assert as a counterclaim in a responsive
pleading any claim then had against an opposing party which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim"); Conney v. Erickson, 251 F.
Supp. 986, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1966) (explaining "Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
compels a counterclaim if it arises out of the same 'transaction or occurrence').
241 See Lawhorn v. Atl. Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating that "if the counterclaim is one which must be asserted, i.e. is compulsory, then it must be set forth in a pleading"); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. I11.
1954) (finding that "[a]
reading of Rule 13 makes it plain that a counterclaim may only be set forth in a 'pleading' by a
'pleader'); In re House of Gus Holder, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D.N.J. 1950) (same); see, e.g.,
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (D. Del. 1984) (explaining that "because [the
defendant] has filed no pleading, its counterclaims must be dismissed and/or stricken at this juncture"). See generally RLJCS Enters., Inc. v. Prof lBenefit Trust, Inc., No. 03 C 6080, 2004 WL
2033067, at *2 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (commenting that "[the] Rules do not appear to contemplate
the filing of a counterclaim independent of an answer"); Hubner v. Schoonmaker, 18 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 741, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (reasoning that "[u]nder the terms of Rules 7 and 13, a counterclaim is not a pleading in and of itself, but, rather, must be asserted as part of an answer or
other responsive pleading").
242 See Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 499, 506 (N.D. I11.
1977) (explaining
that "[w]here the defendant in an action is obligated to plead, i.e., file an answer, failure to assert
a compulsory counterclaim in such an answer precludes subsequent litigation on that claim"),
aff'd, 598 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1979); cf Horn & Hardart Co. v. Nat'l Rail Passenger Corp., 843
F.2d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (commenting "[f]or a counterclaim to be compulsory, [the defen-
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pleading,243 the filing of a Rule 12(b) motion ordinarily extends not only
the time within which the defendant is required to answer,244 but also the
245
time within which it must assert any compulsory counterclaims.
Conversely, a defendant ordinarily waives any compulsory counterclaims not asserted in its initial responsive pleading, 246 and-unlike a
motion to dismiss 24724-an answer clearly is a responsive pleading.2 48 Thus,

dant] would have to have been obliged to submit responsive pleadings"); LeBrew v. Reich, No.
03-CV-1832 (JG) (KAM), 2006 WL 1662595, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2006) (noting
"[c]ounterclaims are subject to the same 20-day time limit as an answer, because any counterclaims must be asserted as part of a responsive pleading").
243 See United States v. Snider, 779 F.2d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining "Rule 13(a)
only requires a compulsory counterclaim if the party who desires to assert a claim has served a
pleading."); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir. 1979) (same);
United States v. Thompson, 262 F. Supp. 340, 343 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (concluding that "a compulsory counterclaim need be asserted only if responsive pleadings are filed").
244 See Jorden v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 877 F.2d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that "the
defendant's motions to dismiss extended the time for them to file answers"); McKinley Assocs.,
LLC v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 169, 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). "Where a defendant
files a motion to dismiss before serving an answer, the date by which a defendant's answer must
be served is extended to within 10 days of notice of the court's action on the motion." Id.; InterCity Prods. Corp. v. Willey, 149 F.R.D. 563, 569 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating "several motions to
dismiss are pending which have effectively postponed the requirement that an answer be filed").
245 See Mun. Energy Agency v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 804 F.2d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that because the defendant filed a 12(b)(6) motion, the "time for filing an answer and
counterclaim ha[s] not arrived"); N. Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (noting that a compulsory counterclaim "need not have been asserted immediately but
could await, without being lost, the disposition of a motion to dismiss"); In re Integrated Res.,
Inc. Real Estate Litig., 851 F. Supp. 556, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that "counterclaims, compulsory or permissive, need not be filed while [its] motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint is
pending"); cf Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Jett, 118 F.R.D. 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Rule
13(a) requires that a compulsory counterclaim be raised in a pleading. If a motion to dismiss is
filed in lieu of a responsive pleading, and the motion to dismiss is granted, Rule 13(a) will not bar
the defendant from asserting his compulsory counterclaims in a later action").
246 See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating "[a]
compulsory counterclaim is compulsory; unless set forth in the answer to the complaint it is
waived."); Full Draw Prods., 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 ("Under Rule 13(a), a party waives counterclaims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence if they are not asserted in the first responsive pleading."); AT&T Corp. v. Am. Cash Card Corp., 184 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (same); Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Gough, 160 F.R.D. 467, 470 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (same); Merz
v. Hemmerle, 90 F.R.D. 566, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that "compulsory counterclaims ...
must be pleaded in a responsive pleading upon pain of loss").
247 See Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (commenting "a motion
to dismiss is not a responsive pleading within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Ternisky, 999 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1993) (observing that "a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.. is not a pleading"). See generally Great Am. Ins. Co. v. A.G.
Ship Maint. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The only 'pleadings' that exist in
federal practice are complaints, answers, replies, answers to cross-claims, third-party complaints,
and third party-answers") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a)).
248 See Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078 (S.D.
Ind. 2002) (asserting "[a]n answer is a responsive pleading"); J. Slotnik Co. v. Clemco Indus.,
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a defendant's submission of even a partial answer with its motion to dismiss249 (or with a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings)-- might
preclude it from pursuing any compulsory counterclaims not asserted at
that time.25 As the court in Vanguard Military Equipment Corp. v. David
B. Finestone Co. 252 explained:

Just because an answer does not respond to all the allegations in the complaint does not make it any more or less a
"pleading" for Rule 7(a) ... purposes. If the answer does

not adequately address "each claim asserted" as required
by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b), it may be deemed to be a deficient
253
answer, but it is still an answer nonetheless.
254
The court in Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
effectively rejected this analysis, 255 holding that a defendant who submitted
a partial answer with its partial motion to dismiss had not waived a com-

127 F.R.D. 435, 440 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating "[t]here is no question but that an answer is a 'responsive pleading').
249 See, e.g., Watters v. Harrah's Ill. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 667, 668 (N.D. 111.1998) (explaining that "[iln response to [the plaintiff's] complaint, [the defendant] filed an answer to Counts I
and II and a motion to dismiss Count II"); Klausing v. Whirlpool Corp., 623 F. Supp. 156, 15758 (S.D. Ohio 1985) ("defendant.. filed a timely answer to count two of the complaint and a motion to dismiss count one of the complaint."), appeal dismissed, 785 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1986).
250 See, e.g., Schiappa v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 403 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) ("[djefendant filed an answer and a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings."); cf
Martin v. Cook County Hous. Auth., No. 05 C 6057, 2006 WL 642649, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10,
2006) ("[The defendant] expressed a desire to answer the first two counts [of the plaintiffs complaint] and move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the second two.").
251 See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(suggesting that a defendant's obligation to assert counterclaims may arise when it serves "an answer (or partial answer)") (emphasis added), vacated and remanded, 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002). But see Bayer CropScience, LP v. Booth, No. Civ.A. 7:04-CV-92, 2005 WL 2095765, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2005) ("[allthough Rule 13(a) requires defendants to plead compulsory
counterclaims in their first responsive pleading, Rule 13(f) gives district courts discretion to allow
a party to set up a counterclaim by amendment.").
252 6 F. Supp. 2d488 (E.D. Va. 1997).
253 Id. at 492; see also Rothman v. Specialty Care Network, Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-2445, 2000
WL 1470221, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2000) (rejecting the contention that "an answer is not a 'responsive' pleading if... it responds to fewer than all of the counts of a complaint").
254 No. 89-2839-CIV-NESBITT, 1994 WL 912242 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 1994).
255 Davis was a class action antitrust case. See id. at * 1. The defendant filed an answer addressing only the plaintiffs' federal and state antitrust claims, and moved to dismiss the plaintiffs'
remaining state law claims. See id. at *35. When the defendant filed a separate counterclaim, the
plaintiffs moved to strike the counterclaim, arguing that it was untimely because the defendant
"was required to file the Counterclaim with its Answer." Id. at **34-35. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, holding that the defendant had not been obligated to assert its counterclaim
"due to the pendency of its motion to dismiss" the state law claims it had not answered. Id. at
*35.
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pulsory counterclaim it did not assert with the answer.256 However, obtain-

ing an extension of time to answer until after the court's ruling on the motion would have avoided the issue altogether, 257 because a plaintiff "may
not claim a waiver of an alleged compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13
until the time for defendants' pleadings to be filed has arrived. 258
A defendant seeking such an extension should be mindful of the

fact that an enlargement of time to answer (and assert counterclaims) under
Rule 6(b)2 59 will not toll any substantive statutes of limitation applicable to
260

However, the same would be true of an automatic

256 See id. at **34-35.

Even if the Davis court's analysis of the compulsory counterclaim

the counterclaims.

issue is correct, the filing of a partial answer with a partial motion to dismiss may give rise to unanticipated arguments that the defendant -- or occasionally even the plaintiff -- has inadvertently
waived other significant rights. See, e.g.,
Horwitz v.Alloy Auto. Co., 677 F. Supp. 564, 566
(N.D. Il.1988) ("[d]efendants ...argue that plaintiffs' failure to assert a jury demand within 10
days of defendants' partial answer to the first amended complaint operates as a waiver of plaintiffs' right to a jury trial on any of the issues raised in that complaint or any subsequently
amended complaint") (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b)); Paragon Int'l, N.V. v. Standard Plastics,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 88, 89-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The ParagonInt'l, N. V.court stated:
The defendants have moved to dismiss for improper venue only counts two and three.
Since venue may be waived by the serving of an answer to a complaint, the defendants
have by answering the first amended complaint with respect to the first, fourth and fifth
counts waived any objection to venue on those counts.
ParagonInt'l, N. V., 353 F. Supp. at 89-90.
257 See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. R.V. D'Alfonso Co., 727 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) (Campbell,
C.J., dissenting) (observing that an extension of "the Rule 12(a) period for filing responsive
pleadings.. of course extended the 20 days as to all matters which defendant was entitled to file
as part of his answer, including.. counterclaims"); cf Gibson v. Casto, 523 S.E.2d 564, 565-66
(Ga. 1999) (holding that "a stipulated extension of time within which to file an answer and defensive pleadings[] also extends the time to file a compulsory counterclaim" because an extension of
time to submit such pleadings "should likewise apply to the mandatory contents of those pleadings") (applying state procedural law).
258 Potter v. Carvel Stores of N.Y., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 462, 464-65 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 314
F. 2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); see also ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F. Supp. 234, 237 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining "[a]s no answer was required, the compulsory counterclaim rule did
not have its usual effect of requiring the defendants to assert any claims they might have had
against the plaintiffs which arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter
of the plaintiffs' action"); In re Integrated Res., Inc. Real Estate Ltd. P'ships Sec. Litig, 851 F.
Supp. 556, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating "Rule 13 is inapplicable where the pleading to which the
Rule refers has not yet been required").
259 See, e.g., Local 1-2, Utility Workers of Am. v. Helmer, 734 F. Supp. 652, 652-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (explaining "the late filing of an answer was due to the excusable neglect of defendants. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2), the Court retroactively enlarges
the time so that the currently filed answer and counterclaims are deemed timely filed") (emphasis
added).
260 See Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 464 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000). "Rule 6(b), by its own
terms, only applies to time limits set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or to limits set by
the court... It cannot be used to extend a statutory limit." Id.; Parker v. Marcotte, 975 F. Supp.
1266, 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("the Court may not utilize Rule 6(b) to extend the statute of limita-
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enlargement of time under Rule 12(a). 26' In addition, the statute of limitations issue is purely academic in federal question cases 262 if, as some courts
hold,263 the filing of the plaintiffs complaint tolls the limitations periods
applicable not only to the plaintiffs own claims, 264 but also to any compul-

tions."), revd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 747 F. Supp. 634, 640 (D. Kan. 1990) (stating "[the] argument that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure determine whether [a] claim was timely filed for statute of limitations
purposes is simply wrong as a matter of law").
261 See Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1009 (D. Colo. 2000).
[C]ompulsory counterclaims that expired after the plaintiffs complaint was filed were
time-barred "even though Rule 12(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extends the time for a responsive pleading to ten days after the denial of a motion under
Rule 12 and the defendant advanced its counterclaim in an answer timely filed under
that rule."
Id. at 1009 (bracketing omitted) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); cf Sea-Land Serv., 727 F.2d at 4 n.1 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[w]hether defendant brought this action within the...
statute [of limitations] is, of course, a separate issue from whether the defendant complied with Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(a).. .A counterclaim might be barred by the statute of limitations even though timely pleaded
under the rules, and vice versa").
262 In diversity cases, "the question whether the filing of the complaint tolls the statute of
limitations as to a compulsory counterclaim... is to be decided by state law." Hatfield, 747 F.
Supp. at 640 (quoting 3 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.11, at 13-

48 (1989)). Existing state law on the subject "exhibits a rather confusing state of conflicting authority." Armstrong v. Logsdon, 469 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). Some states follow
"the general view.. .that 'the institution of plaintiff's suit tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations governing a compulsory counterclaim."' Tallman v. Durussel, 721 P.2d 985,
989 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380,
389 (4th Cir. 1982)). However, at least one state court has held that "a plaintiff, by instituting an
action before the expiration of a statute of limitation, does not toll the running of that statute
against compulsory counterclaims filed by the defendant after the statute has expired." Nevada
State Bank v. Jamison Family P'ship, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Nev. 1990); see also Duhammel v.
Star, 653 P.2d 15, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (observing that "the law in Arizona does not appear to
support" the view that "where commencement of an action is within the statute of limitations, the
filing of a compulsory counterclaim.. .is not barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter").
263See Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 1978) (observing that
the view that the filing of the plaintiffs complaint tolls the statute of limitations applicable to any
compulsory counterclaims "has not been entirely accepted"); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (D. Haw. 1979) (commenting that "[tihe courts are sharply split as
to whether the filing of the complaint tolls the statute of limitations governing a compulsory
counterclaim based on federal law").
264 See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). "As a
general rule, a statute of limitations stops running on the date that a claim is interposed. In federal court, a claim is interposed when the complaint containing the claim is filed." Id.; Wheeler v.
Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1177. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("[u]nder federal law the
statute of limitations is computed from the date of accrual of the cause of action to the date when
the action is commenced in the federal courts by the filing of a complaint").
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sory counterclaims subsequently asserted by the defendant.265
Under the prevailing view that a partial motion to dismiss automatically enlarges the time to answer all of the plaintiffs claims,266 a defendant filing such a motion technically need not obtain a court-ordered

enlargement of time to answer the unchallenged claims.2 67 Nevertheless, a
court is likely to be receptive to a timely request for the clarity an explicit
enlargement of the answer period would provide,26 s particularly if it is apprised of the existing split of authority concerning the defendant's obligation to respond to the claims not addressed in its motion.269
In Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers,2 70 for example, the defendants moved to

265 See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
"The institution of a plaintiffs suit suspends the running of limitations on a compulsory counterclaim while the suit is pending." Id.; Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 913 F. Supp. 655, 660
(D.P.R. 1995) (explaining that "[i]n general, the institution of plaintiff's suit would toll the statute
of limitations for a compulsory counterclaim, but not for a permissive counterclaim") (citations
omitted).
266 See supra notes 40-83 and accompanying text.
267 See Tel. Audio Prods., Inc. v. Smith, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0863-P, 1998 WL 159932, at
*1 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. Mar 26, 1998) (denying the defendants' motion "to extend time to plead
pending decision on [their] motion to dismiss" because Rule 12(a)(4)(A) "already provide[d]... the relief sought"); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743, 751 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Klein court found:
defendants move additionally for an order pursuant to Rule 6(b), F.R.Civ.P., extending
the time within which they must answer to "ten days after the decision of [their] motions." Having moved pursuant to Rule 12(b), F.R.Civ.P., for dismissal.. .the time provisions of Rule 12(a), F.R.Civ.P., automatically alter and extend defendants' time to
answer as per defendants' request and without the need of a court order since these motions to dismiss were not fully granted.
Klein, 306 F. Supp. at 751 n.5.
268 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 811 (2d Cir. 1940) (commenting "[n]o
motion to dismiss was made as to [plaintiffs third cause of action], but defendant obtained an
order below postponing the time for answering this cause until the disposition of the motion for
dismissal [of the plaintiff's other claims]"); Citizens Mortgage Corp. v. Investors Mortgage Ins.
Co., 706 F. Supp. 819, 821 (M.D. Fla. 1989) ("[t]he motion to dismiss [Count II].. .requests that
the Court extend the time to answer Count I of the amended complaint.. until the Court rules on
the motion to dismiss. The Court finds the request well-taken"); Carver v. Cont'l Grain Co., 662
F. Supp. 250, 252 (D. Minn. 1987) (denying "defendants' motion to dismiss [Count I and granting] [d]efendants' motion for an extension of time to answer Count II of plaintiffs' Complaint").
269 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (noting that "[c]itations to the [relevant] cases should
be included" in any motion to enlarge the time for answering submitted with a partial motion to
dismiss); cf Hulex Music v. Santy, 698 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 n.3 (D.N.H. 1988) (noting that the
defendant's motion to supplement his answer was "procedurally defective" under a local court
rule because it was "not supported by legal authority").
270 915 F. Supp. 378, reconsiderationdenied, 916 F. Supp. 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87
F.3d 1242 (1Ith Cir. 1996).
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dismiss some of the counts of the plaintiffs' amended complaint, 27' and simultaneously requested an enlargement of time to respond to the remaining
counts under Rule 6(b).272 The court held that the requested extension was
warranted by the pending motion to dismiss 273 and, in accordance with
Rule 12(a), permitted the defendants to submit their answer within ten days
of its ruling on the motion.
Other courts have reached similar results. 27 5 In Kohloff v. Ford
Motor Co., 2 76 for example, the defendant filed what was, in effect, a motion
to dismiss one of the two causes of action asserted in the plaintiffs
amended complaint. 277 The plaintiff subsequently applied for a default
judgment, 278 arguing that the defendant failed to file and serve an answer
271 See id. at 379-80, 381 (noting that the defendants moved to dismiss "Counts Three, Four,
Seven and, Nine of the [plaintiffs'] amended complaint" and, on separate grounds, "Count Eight
of the amended complaint").
272 See id at 384.
273 See id.; cf Oil Express Nat'l, Inc. v. D'Alessandro, 173 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1997)

(holding that a "partial motion to dismiss allows for altering the [time] limits of FED.R.CIv.P.
12(a) with respect to answering those claims not addressed in [the] motion").
274 See Preserve EndangeredAreas, 915 F. Supp. at 384; cf Morgan v. Gandalf, Ltd., 165
Fed. Appx. 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[d]efendants... were required to file their answer within 10
days after the district court ruled on their motion for partial dismissal") (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(4)(A)).
275 See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 300 F. Supp. 2d 660, 670 (N.D. Il1. 2004). "Cook County
requests leave to file an answer to count V of the amended complaint after this Court has ruled on
the present motion [to dismiss counts I through IV]. We grant Cook County's request and order it
to answer count five within ten days [of the Court's ruling]." Id. (citation omitted); Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622, 629 (D.D.C. 1991). In Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., the
court stated:
Defendants have moved for an extension of time in which to respond to Count I of
plaintiffs' complaint up to and including ten days after the Court rules on defendants'
motion to dismiss [Counts I1and III of the complaint]. Plaintiffs have opposed the motion on the grounds that a motion under Rule 12(b) does not toll the time to respond to
counts that the motion does not address.. Defendants' request for an extension of time
has not halted the progress of discovery or otherwise delayed the case. The Court,
therefore, grants defendants' motion for an extension of time to respond to count I.
Fleck, 763 F. Supp. at 629.
276 27 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
277 See id. at 804. More specifically, the defendant invoked Rule 12(b) to procure "an order
to show cause why service of the summons as to the second cause of action should not be
quashed." Id.; cf Collateral Lenders Comm. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 281 F.
Supp. 899, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[t]he defendant, by order to show cause.. .moved to dismiss the
complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6)").
278 The plaintiff obtained "an order requiring the defendant to show cause why judgment
should not be entered by default." Kohloff, 27 F. Supp. at 804; cf Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp.
748, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining "[i]n accordance with this Court's practice in handling applications for a default judgment, plaintiffs moved, by Order to Show Cause... for a default judgment against the defendant, pursuant to Rule 55").
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The defendant asserted that under Rule 12(a),

its submission of a partial motion to dismiss extended its time to answer "as
to both causes of action. ,280 Without deciding whether the defendant was
technically in default, 281 the court simply invoked Rule 6(b) to deny the
plaintiffs application and direct the parties to proceed with the litigation.282
VI. CONCLUSION
Most courts considering the issue have held that the submission of

a partial motion to dismiss automatically extends the defendant's time to
answer the remainder of the complaint. 283 Nevertheless, in view of the lim-

ited authority on the subject, 28 4 a defendant filing such a motion should
take additional steps to minimize its risk of defaulting on the counts not addressed in its motion. 285 While this can be accomplished in a variety of
ways, 286 the most practical approach is for the defendant to seek an
enlargement of time to respond to the remainder of the complaint concur279 See Kohloff 27 F. Supp. at 804.
280 Id.

281 See id; cf Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Me. 1984) (acknowledging "[d]efendant is technically in default with respect to its Answer or other response to
those portions of Plaintiffs Complaint which Defendant's Motion to Dismiss did not reach") (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated on othergrounds, 764 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1985).
282 See Kohloff 27 F. Supp. at 804; cf Golden v. Nat'l Fin. Adjustors, 555 F. Supp. 42, 45
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (indicating that where a defendant "sought to defend against [the] action," the
entry of a default judgment may be unwarranted even if the defendant "did not properly make a
motion to dismiss which enlarged the time to file a complaint [sic] under Rule 12(a)"). See generally Carroll v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 14 F.R.D. 84, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("Rule 6(b) has been applied with effect to worthy though neglectful parties to relieve them from default judgments when
answers were not served within the time limited by the rule"), aff'd, 202 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1953).
283 See Pestube Sys., Inc. v. HomeTeam Pest Def., LLC, 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,304,
at 105,156 (D. Ariz. 2006). "[T]he majority of courts have expressly held that even though a
pending motion to dismiss may only address some of the claims alleged, the motion to dismiss
tolls the time to respond to all claims." Id.
284 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21 (pointing out "[tihere is a dearth of case law on the
issue of whether filing a partial motion to dismiss.. .extends the time to answer a complaint");
Knight, supra note 13, at 20 ("Will a Rule 12(b) motion addressed only to some claims extend the
time for answering all claims, or must the defendant file a 'responsive pleading' as to the claims
for which dismissal is not sought? [ 1 This question seems to have received little attention.").
285 See Belinfante, supra note 17, at 21.
Although it appears that the law weighs on the side of extending the time to answer,
the sparseness of the authority can cause concern. Accordingly, the cautious litigator,
faced with filing a partial motion to dismiss, should be prepared to file additional motions in order to alert the court that it will not file an answer.
Id.

286 See supra notes 175-282 and accompanying text.
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rently with the filing of its partial motion to dismiss. 28 7 This approach not
only protects the defendant's interests in the litigation, 88 but also promotes
judicial economy by eliminating the need for duplicative pleadings and potentially narrowing the scope of subsequent discovery.289

287

See Cagan, supra, note 13, at 204 (stating "an attorney who files a partial motion to dis-

miss would be prudent to.. .move the court for an extension of time to answer the unchallenged
counts"). See generally Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268, 268 (N.D. Ohio 1947) ("[e]xtensions
always may be asked for, and usually are granted upon a showing of good cause, if timely made")
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)).
288 See, e.g., MacNeil v. Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157, 158-59 (D. Del. 1958) (granting the
defendant's "motion to extend the time to answer until 20 days after the determination of [its partial] motion to dismiss"); cf Jim's Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Shutok, 153 F. Supp. 274, 275 (W.D. Pa.
1957) (declining to relieve defendant of the consequences of failure to file timely answer because
"[n]o effort was made to enlarge the 20-day period fixed for filing an answer by Rule 12(a)").
289 In R.E.F. Golf Co. v. Roberts Metals Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1070, 1072 (M.D. Fla.
1992), for example, the court made the following observations in extending Rule 12 analysis to a
motion not specifically permitted under that rule:
The filing of a Motion under Rule 12(a) [sic] FED.R.Civ.P. extends the period of time
to respond to a pleading pending disposition of the motion by the court. The Court, in
its discretion, may order the period of time in which to respond enlarged. Rule 6(b)
Fed.R.Civ.P. The interests of conservation of judicial resources and avoidance of duplicative litigation and unnecessary expense justify tolling the time to answer until the
Court ruled on the Motion.

